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ABSTRACT
This Article operates at the intersection of privacy law, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, and prescription-drug surveillance instigated by 
the U.S. drug-overdose crisis. Reputable reporting sources frequently 
frame that ongoing crisis as a prescription-drug-overdose “epidemic.” 
Current epidemiological data, however, indicate that the majority of 
American overdose deaths are now a result of illicit and polysubstance 
drug use and not prescription-opioid misuse. The prescription-opioid-
centric frame has nonetheless sparked the rapid rise of surveillance of
prescribers and patients in the form of state prescription-drug
monitoring program (“PDMP”) databases. State PDMPs, which 
maintain and analyze significant data concerning every dispensed 
controlled substance, surreptitiously collect a stunning amount of 
sensitive health information. 
PDMPs are predominantly law enforcement investigative tools 
dressed up in public-health-promoting rhetoric. Under the guise of 
rogue prescriber, pill mill, and doctor–shopper crackdowns, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) routinely self-issues subpoenas
that permit the agency to conduct warrantless sweeps of the voluminous
data stored in state PDMP databases. These rampant law enforcement 
sweeps procure highly sensitive health information and raise serious 
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constitutional privacy concerns. The Supreme Court’s recent Fourth 
Amendment decision in Carpenter v. United States, however, may 
limit the DEA’s otherwise unfettered access to state PDMP databases.
Carpenter and the Fourth Amendment doctrines central to its 
holding motivate this Article and animate its two core contentions. 
First, pertinent pre-Carpenter precedent requires the DEA to obtain a
warrant in order to conduct sweeps of state PDMP databases. Second,
courts are even more likely to rule that warrantless DEA searches of
highly sensitive health-care data run afoul of the Fourth Amendment 
in the post-Carpenter world. Simply stated, patient prescribing records 
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INTRODUCTION
Physicians are not agents of the police power of government, and
should not be forced to choose between protecting their patients 
against prosecution or protecting them against disease.1 
The United States is in the throes of “the deadliest drug [overdose] 
crisis in American history.”2 Each day, nearly two hundred Americans 
die from drug overdoses;3 in 2016, drug overdoses superseded car 
accidents as the number one cause of accidental deaths in the country.4 
1. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons in Support of 
Respondent-Appellant Abbas T. Zadeh, in Support of Reversal at 8, United States v. Zadeh, 820
F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-10202 & 15-10195), 2015 WL 4380678, at *8. 
2. Maya Salam, The Opioid Epidemic: A Crisis Years in the Making, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/opioid-crisis-public-health-emergency.html
[https://perma.cc/S34L-UMZN].
 3. HOLLY HEDEGAARD, MARGARET WARNER & ARIALDI M. MINIÑO, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR22-C8BR].
 4. Gillian Mohney, Deaths from Opioid Overdoses Now Higher than Car Accident
Fatalities, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/deaths-from-
opioid-overdoses-higher-than-car-accident-fatalities#1 [https://perma.cc/AT3M-A7JJ].
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On October 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump declared the drug-
overdose crisis “a public health emergency.”5 
Journalists, public-health experts, and pundits frequently frame
this public-health catastrophe as a prescription-drug-overdose crisis6 
primarily attributable to the overprescribing of opioid analgesics.7 
Even assuming this description of the overdose crisis was once 
accurate, the national health-data statistics tell a much different story 
today. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”), nearly two-thirds of overdose deaths in 2016 were 
attributable to illicit substances, such as heroin, fentanyl,
methamphetamines, cocaine, or some lethal combination thereof, and 
not prescription drugs.8 
Moreover, the percentage of chronic-pain patients prescribed an 
opioid treatment regime who develop use disorder is exceedingly low. 
“[S]tudies show an incidence [of misuse of prescription opioids in such
5. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emergency’ but Requests
No Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/trump-
opioid-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/U7AX-3WS8].
 6. See, e.g., Thomas C. Buchmueller & Colleen Carey, The Effect of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs on Opioid Utilization in Medicine, 10 AM. ECON. J. 77, 78 (2018) (“The
misuse of prescription opioids has become a serious epidemic in the United States.” (emphasis
added)); Sarah Vander Schaaff, Amid the Opioid Crisis, Some Seriously Ill People Risk Losing
Drugs They Depend On, WASH. POST (July 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/health-science/amid-the-opioid-crisis-some-seriously-ill-people-risk-losing-drugs-they-
depend-on/2018/07/13/65850640-730d-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html [https://perma.cc/
QGP9-EKR6] (reporting that “the nation [is] now fighting to reverse a drug epidemic fed by 
prescription opioids” (emphasis added)). 
7. See, e.g., Aaron Kessler, Elizabeth Cohen & Katherine Grise, CNN Exclusive: The More 
Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More Money They Make, CNN (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/11/health/prescription-opioid-payments-eprise/index.html [https://
perma.cc/Y25X-DWHV].
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths Continue to Rise; Increase Fueled by Synthetic Opioids 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2018/p0329-drug-overdose-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/7FP2-D825]; see also Nicolas Terry, Reports on the Opioid Crisis Are Full of
Misidentified Problems and Poorly Calibrated Solutions, BILL HEALTH (July 19, 2018),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2018/07/19/reports-on-the-opioid-crisis-are-full-of-
misidentified-problems-and-poorly-calibrated-solutions [https://perma.cc/VY94-S6CV]
(explaining that “increasingly, the substance abuse crisis goes beyond opioids, with the . . .
(DEA) recently reporting a significant spike in the availability and use of cocaine, and
methamphetamine . . . on the rise nationwide” and “the . . . crisis now revolves around the abuse
of non-prescription opioids by non-medical users, typified by . . . U.S. Post Office-delivered
fentanyl”).
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patients ranging] from less than 1 percent to 8 percent.”9 As a recent 
study reaffirmed, most Americans who suffer opioid use disorder did 
not develop that disease in the normal course of indicated medical 
treatment.10 They are more typically individuals with extensive 
histories of polysubstance use and misuse.11 
The ongoing and flawed framing of the overdose crisis as a
prescription-drug problem has provoked policymakers to focus on
supply-side, law-enforcement-oriented solutions12 while ignoring the 
root causes and socioeconomic drivers of drug consumption.13 This 
supply-side-dominated approach has resulted in the enactment of 
numerous dragnet-style laws at the state and federal level aimed at 
cracking down on rogue prescribers, pain-pill mills, and prescription-
drug “doctor shoppers.”14 It also has sparked the rapid rise of 
prescriber and patient surveillance in the form of federal monitoring 
legislation15 and state prescription-drug monitoring programs 
(“PDMPs”).16 
9. Sally Satel, The Truth About Painkiller Addiction, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/what-america-got-wrong-about-opioid-
crisis/595090 [https://perma.cc/JAB7-W9LV].
10. Khary K. Rigg, Katherine McLean, Shannon M. Monnat, Glenn E. Sterner III & Ashton
M. Verdery, Opioid Misuse Initiation: Implications for Intervention, 10 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES
1 (2019). 
11. Id.
 12. See, e.g., David Herzberg, Honoria Guarino, Pedro Mateu-Gelabert & Alex S. Bennett,
Recurring Epidemics of Pharmaceutical Drug Abuse in America: Time for an All-Drug Strategy, 
106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 408, 408 (2016) (explaining that, while “[s]upply-side and criminal
justice approaches” continue to dominate U.S. drug policy, “history offers little evidence that 
primary reliance on such strategies can genuinely reduce problematic drug use”).
 13. See, e.g., Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy 
Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182 (2018) (arguing
that the root causes of the opioid crisis are “[e]roding economic opportunity, evolving approaches
to pain treatment, and limited drug treatment”); Zachary Seigel, The Opioid Crisis Is About More
Than Corporate Greed, NEW REPUBLIC (July 30, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/ 
154560/opioid-crisis-corporate-greed [https://perma.cc/KL2V-N2RN] (arguing that the opioid
crisis was fueled not by “a few bad apples in the pharmaceutical industry” but rather by the 
country’s entire profit-driven health-care system and the neglectful or incompetent DEA).
 14. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Medicare Is Cracking Down on Opioids. Doctors Fear Pain 
Patients Will Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
03/27/health/opioids-medicare-limits.html [https://perma.cc/D7FP-45YM]; Barry Meier, A New
Painkiller Crackdown Targets Drug Distributors, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/business/to-fight-prescription-painkiller-abuse-dea-targets-
distributors.html [https://perma.cc/5WSV-L5Y6].
15. National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109– 
60, 119 Stat. 1979 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 208g-3 (2018)).
16. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 6, at 2.
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State PDMP laws mandate that dispensers report patients’ 
prescription-related health information to an electronic database 
maintained and monitored by a designated state agency.17 Every time
a pharmacy dispenses a controlled substance to a patient, state PDMPs 
receive a host of sensitive health data, including the patient’s name,
address, age, and gender; the date and place the prescription is filled;
the identity of the prescribing physician; the drug prescribed, the drug 
dosage; and the drug quantity.18 PDMPs then make that information
available to “authorized users,” such as prescribers, pharmacists, and 
state medical boards. While the ostensible purposes of PDMPs vary 
across jurisdictions, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) contends 
that PDMPs “constitute a tool used primarily by medical professionals 
to enhance patient care when prescribing and dispensing controlled
substances.”19 DOJ further claims that PDMPs provide medical 
professionals with access to real-time patient-prescribing data in order 
“to support the best clinical decisions regarding the appropriate 
treatment for patients, to reduce the likelihood of adverse drug 
reactions, and to assist with addiction treatment.”20 
DOJ’s characterization of PDMPs as public-health-promoting 
tools, however, is unsurprisingly suspect. As explained in more detail
below, there is no reliable evidence that supports the conclusion that 
PDMPs have either encouraged prescribers to provide evidence-based 
treatment to individuals with opioid use disorder or reduced the drug-
overdose rate. Moreover, the United States has been engaged in an
unproductive, decades-long “war on drugs,” in which the government’s 
go-to weapons have been surveillance, punishment, and incapacitation. 
DOJ is not in the business of providing addiction treatment that 
promotes evidence-based public-health outcomes. The agency’s 
17. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUR. OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUSTICE SYSTEM USE 
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 5 (Jan. 2015),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Global-JusticeSystemUsePDMPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/72KF-
PFWJ].
 18. See generally Christopher R. Smith, Somebody’s Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy 
in Prescription Health Information, 36 VT. L. REV. 931, 931 (2012) (explaining that “[i]n today’s
ever-expanding world of internet technology and electronic data transmission, patient disclosure
of prescription health information is being distributed to a widening circle of entities and
individuals, raising serious patient privacy concerns, especially when the patient has not given
consent to such dissemination”).
 19. JUSTICE SYSTEM USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS, supra note
17, at 5.
 20. Id.
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mission is to prosecute and punish “over prescribers” and individuals 
who suffer from drug-use disorders. 
In fact, the United States has relegated many of the functions 
central to the regulation of controlled substances not to public-health 
experts but to a federal law enforcement agency—the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)—for almost fifty years.21 The
DEA, which is a subagency within DOJ, derives its broad authority to
classify, regulate, and surveil controlled substances from the 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (“CSA”).22 The CSA created a 
closed chain for controlled-substance distribution specifically designed
to monitor legal products as they were transferred among DEA-
registered handlers (“registrants”) to prevent their “diversion”—that 
is, trade, sale, or other delivery—into the illicit market.23 
The DEA manages diversion by maintaining strict control over 
the availability of controlled substances “through quotas, registration, 
recordkeeping, reporting, and security requirements.”24 The agency 
has described a CSA-compliant distribution of a controlled substance 
from manufacturer to patient as follows:
21. The DEA was created in 1973 by President Nixon by executive order. Exec. Order No.
11727, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,357 (July 10, 1973). It should be noted that, while the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) has primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of
pharmaceuticals, regardless of whether they are controlled substances under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99i (2018), the FDA does not have primary authority 
to regulate or monitor the use of controlled substances, JOHNATHAN H. DUFF, CONG. RES.
SERV., OPIOID TREATMENT PROGRAMS AND RELATED FEDERAL REGULATIONS 1 (June 12,
2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10219 [https://perma.cc/J6G7-CSHG]
(“Under the Controlled Substances Act . . . the . . . DEA . . . in the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has primary responsibility for regulating the use of controlled substances for legitimate medical,
scientific, research, and industrial purposes, and for preventing these substances from being 
diverted for illegal purposes.”).
22. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971). Technically, the CSA delegates the duty to regulate 
controlled substances to the U.S. Attorney General. 21 U.S.C. § 801. The Attorney General, in 
turn, has delegated that authority by regulation to the DEA. 21 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (2018).
 23. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)(1) (explaining that, in determining whether to register a
Schedule I or II manufacturer applicant, the DEA should consider “maintenance of effective 
controls against diversion of particular controlled substances and any controlled substance in 
schedule I or II compounded therefrom into other than legitimate medical, scientific, research, or
industrial channels”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2005) (observing that “[t]he
main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances” and pointing out that “Congress was particularly
concerned with the need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels” 
(footnote omitted)). 
24. John A. Gilbert & Barbara Rowland, Practicing Medicine in a Drug Enforcement World, 
in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 394 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2015). 
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[A] controlled substance, after being manufactured by a DEA-
registered manufacturer, may be transferred to a DEA-registered
distributor for subsequent distribution to a DEA-registered retail
pharmacy. After a DEA-registered practitioner, such as a physician 
or a dentist, issues a prescription for a controlled substance to a 
patient (i.e., the ultimate user), that patient can fill that prescription
at a retail pharmacy to obtain that controlled substance. In this
system, the manufacturer, the distributor, the practitioner, and the 
retail pharmacy are all required to be DEA registrants, or to be
exempted from the requirement of registration, to participate in the 
process.25 
The CSA, in turn, requires controlled-substance manufacturers 
and distributors to submit reports detailing every sale, delivery, or
other disposal of those drugs, including opioids, to the DEA.26 These
drug transaction reports are then uploaded to the DEA’s Automation
of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (“ARCOS”) database, 
which summarizes them into reports that can be used to identify 
suspicious orders and the potential diversion of “high abuse potential” 
controlled substances, including prescription opioids.27 Importantly,
and unlike state PDMP databases, ARCOS does not track prescription
opioids from the time of prescribing to the sale and dispensing of the 
drugs to the individual patient.28 As a result, ARCOS does not store
any sensitive, patient-identifying health-care data.
In addition to mandating that the DEA manage all controlled-
substance transfers throughout the pharmaceutical-distribution
chain,29 the CSA delegates to the agency final authority to categorize 
25. Disposal of Controlled Substances by Persons Not Registered with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 74 Fed. Reg. 3480, 3481 (Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 1300, 1301, 1304, 1305, 1307).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 827(d)(1).
 27. Id. § 827(d)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 1304.33. ARCOS is “an automated, comprehensive drug 
reporting system which monitors the flow of DEA controlled substances from their point of
manufacture through commercial distribution channels to point of sale or distribution at the 
dispensing/retail level . . . .” Declaration of John J. Martin in Support of the United States of 
America’s Brief Posing Objections to Disclosure of ARCOS Data at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2018). ARCOS data includes the following
information for each CSA-regulated drug transaction: supplier’s name, DEA registration
number, address and business activity, buyer’s name, DEA registration number and address, 
prescription-drug code, transaction date, total dosage units, and total grams. Id. The CSA also
imposes specific duties upon wholesale distributors to monitor, identify, halt, and report 
“suspicious orders” of prescription opioids. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 827(d)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 1304.33.
29. Michael C. Barnes & Gretchen Arndt, The Best of Both Worlds: Applying Federal
Commerce and State Police Powers to Reduce Prescription Drug Abuse, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L.
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drugs, substances, and chemicals into five schedules (I–V) based on 
their medicinal utility and relative “abuse” potential.30 The CSA 
defines Schedule I substances, which include, among other things, 
heroin, LSD, and cannabis, as drugs with “no currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States”31 and “a high potential 
for abuse.”32 Schedule II drugs are those that have both a medically 
accepted use33 and a high potential for abuse.34 Consequently, most 
opioids are classified as Schedule II controlled substances.35 
The drugs enumerated in Schedules III–V, by contrast, have 
moderate to low potential for abuse.36 State PDMPs nonetheless
frequently monitor all Schedule II–V drugs—and even drugs that are
unscheduled, which 
include a number of frequently prescribed medications used to treat 
a wide range of serious medical conditions, including nausea and 
weight loss in cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy, weight loss
associated with AIDS, anxiety disorders, panic disorders, post-
traumatic stress disorder, alcohol addiction withdrawal symptoms, 
opioid addiction, testosterone deficiency, gender identity/gender
dysmorphia, chronic and acute pain, seizure disorder, narcolepsy,
insomnia, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.37 
& POL’Y 271, 281 (2013) (“Under the CSA, the DEA is responsible for preventing, detecting, and
investigating diversion of controlled substances while ensuring the availability of these drugs for
legitimate use.”).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b). The CSA also mandates that the DEA establish aggregate annual-
production quotas for each basic class of controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II. Id. § 
826.
 31. Id. § 812(b)(1)(B). 
32. Id. § 812(b)(1)(A). 
33. Id. § 812(b)(2)(B). 
34. Id. § 812(b)(2)(A). 
35. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)–(c) (2018) (listing all Schedule II opium and opiate substances);
see also, e.g., DEA: U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling 
[https://perma.cc/E69P-ZUMY] (explaining that “Schedule II drugs, substances, or chemicals are
defined as drugs with a high potential for abuse, with use potentially leading to severe
psychological or physical dependence,” opining that “[t]hese drugs are also considered
dangerous,” and enumerating the following opioids as Schedule II drugs: “[c]ombination products 
with less than 15 milligrams of hydrocodone per dosage unit (Vicodin), . . . methadone,
hydromorphone (Dilaudid), meperidine (Demerol), oxycodone (OxyContin), [and] fentanyl”).
A small group of narcotic controlled substances, including the opioid agonist buprenorphine,
which is used to treat opioid use disorder, and drugs that contain relatively low milligrams per
dosage units of codeine, are classified as Schedule III substances. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13(e). 
36. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3)–(5).
37. Brief for Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees at 4, Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-35402). 
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PDMPs, therefore, maintain a wealth of personal prescribing 
information that has no meaningful connection to the prescribing of
either opioids or other substances with high potentials for misuse or 
diversion. The fact that Americans filled 4,063,166,658 prescriptions at 
retail pharmacies in 2017 alone places in context the extent of data that 
PDMPs collect on an annual basis.38 
These data also happen to be both highly personal and incredibly 
revealing. This is because, in the age of personalized medicine and 
precision-targeted pharmacogenetic therapy, it is often possible to 
divine a patient’s medical condition, diagnosis, or disease—and even
the stage and severity of that condition, diagnosis, or disease—simply
by reference to the patient’s prescribing history.39 A patient’s 
prescribing information also details her contraceptive prescribing
history and could reveal other reproductive-related health conditions 
or treatments, such as abortion, pregnancy, and infertility, depending 
on her indicated pharmaceutical treatment.40 The open question, then, 
is whether PDMPs produce positive health-care outcomes in a manner
that somehow justifies their exceptional privacy intrusions. 
Unfortunately, the jury is still out as to whether PDMPs effectively 
reduce drug-overdose deaths, prevent problematic drug use, or impede
diversion into illegal markets. Scholars have argued that prescription-
drug monitoring actually exacerbates—rather than mitigates—the
national drug-overdose crisis for at least four reasons.41 First, PDMP
surveillance and law enforcement scrutiny may encourage individuals 
38. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NUMBER OF RETAIL PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
FILLED AT PHARMACIES BY PAYER (2017), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/state-indicator/total-
retail-rx-drugs [https://perma.cc/73UA-WNNT]. This means that at least four-hundred million
prescriptions are captured by PDMPs on an annual basis. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV.,
R40548, LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE DISPOSAL OF DISPENSED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
5 n.23 (Oct. 19, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40548.pdf [https://perma.cc/A687-2BBS]
(“[B]etween 10%-11% of all drug prescriptions written in the United States are for
pharmaceutical controlled substances.”).
39. Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Med. Ass’ns in Support of the Plaintiffs-Intervenors-
Appellees at 23, Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program., 860 F.3d at 1228 (“[P]rescription
records can reveal a patient’s medical condition, treatment or diagnosis.”).
 40. See, e.g., Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995) (“It is now 
possible from looking at an individual’s prescription records to determine that person’s illnesses,
or even to ascertain such private facts as whether a woman is attempting to conceive a child
through the use of fertility drugs.”). 
41. Scott M. Fishman et al., Regulating Opioid Prescribing Through Prescription Monitoring
Programs: Balancing Drug Diversion and Treatment of Pain, 5 PAIN MED. 309, 311 (2004).
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to forgo needed health-care treatment.42 Second, mandatory PDMP
reporting may incentivize physicians to avoid prescribing PDMP-
monitored substances, even when medically indicated.43 In fact, in May 
2019, the New Hampshire Board of Medicine disciplined a Portsmouth 
physician for inappropriately restricting a chronic-pain patient’s daily 
dose of his long-term opioid treatment regimen and then abandoning 
the patient after he developed suicidal ideation stemming from 
inadequate pain management.44 After an investigation, the Board of 
Medicine determined that the physician violated the ethical standards 
of professional conduct that apply to medical doctors in New 
Hampshire.45 As one news outlet reported:
[The Board’s] conclusion highlights how concerns about the “opioid
crisis,” reinforced by real or perceived demands from the
government, have perverted the doctor-patient relationship, making 
physicians agents of the war on drugs, which is inconsistent with their 
professional duties. The medical board’s decision suggests that New 
Hampshire regulators understand the dangers of those conflicting
priorities. Perhaps not coincidentally, New Hampshire is
also fighting the Drug Enforcement Administration’s demands for
warrantless access to [PDMP] records.46 
Moreover, physician imposition of rapid, involuntary opioid 
tapering and abandonment of chronic-pain patients in response to 
increasing threats of law enforcement investigation and prosecution is 
42. See, e.g., Linda A. Johnson, Americans Are Filling Fewer Prescriptions for Opioids Amid 
Rising Fear of Addiction, TIME (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.yahoo.com/news/americans-filling-
fewer-prescriptions-opioids-154016384.html [https://perma.cc/K6T7-63TS].
43. M. Mofizul Islam & Ian S. McRae, An Inevitable Wave of Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs in the Context of Prescription Opioids: Pros, Cons and Tensions, 15 BMC
PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 1, 2 (2014). 
44. Jacob Sullum, State Regulators Punish Doctor for Cutting a Pain Patient’s Opioid Dose
and Dropping Him After He Became Suicidal, REASON (July 10, 2019, 12:45 PM),
https://reason.com/2019/07/10/state-regulators-punish-doctor-for-cutting-a-pain-patients-opioid-
dose-and-dropping-him-after-he-became-suicidal [https://perma.cc/3YN4-BL2K].
45. Shawne K. Wickham, Portsmouth Doctor Reprimanded for Treatment of Chronic Pain
Patient, N.H. UNION LEADER (July 6, 2019), https://www.unionleader.com/news/ 
health/portsmouth-doctor-reprimanded-for-treatment-of-chronic-pain-patient/article_d45611d5-
f0e3-5a8f-ace5-46bc9d945c90.html [https://perma.cc/89FG-Y4XX].
 46. Sullum, supra note 44. 
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no minor matter.47 Approximately fifty million Americans suffer from 
chronic pain.48 
Third, study data link PDMP surveillance and law enforcement
supply-side crackdowns on prescription drugs to the dramatic spike in
illicit drug misuse and overdose.49 Washington State, for example, has 
realized a 40 percent decrease in overdoses linked to prescription
opioids since 2009, yet “there’s been little progress in driving down the 
rate of opioid overdoses overall.”50 This is because the state has seen a 
dramatic uptick in overdoses attributable to heroin and illicit
fentanyl.51 Finally, “[m]onitoring programs and the predictive
technologies that they deploy may perpetuate biases and have a
disproportionate impact on underprivileged citizens, given their
common roots with other kinds of surveillance of poor, immigrant, and 
stigmatized communities.”52 The bottom line is that “we do not have a 
firm understanding of PDMPs’ effectiveness, nor the potential for 
unintended PDMP consequences or other legal or ethical
quagmires.”53 
47. Nina Shapiro, Amid Pressure to Prescribe Fewer Opioids, Doctors Struggle to Ease
Patients’ Pain, SEATTLE TIMES (June 9, 2019 4:24 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/health/amid-pressure-to-prescribe-fewer-opioids-doctors-struggle-to-ease-patients-
pain [https://perma.cc/PZF9-JP8C] (“Health-care providers who [treat patients on opioids] – and
many refuse – face stigma, a tangle of rules and guidelines, medical and ethical challenges and
potential scrutiny that has not only shut down clinics locally and nations but has led to arrests.”).
48. James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain
Among Adults – United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1001, 1002 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/pdfs/mm6736a2-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P3L-7SVF]. 
49. See, e.g., Theodore J. Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis & Hilary L. Surratt, Effect of Abuse-
Deterrent Formulation of Oxycontin, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 187, 189 (2012); Pradip K. Muhuri,
Joseph C. Gfroerer & M. Christine Davies, Associations of Nonmedical Pain Reliever Use and
Initiation of Heroin Use in the United States, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & QUALITY (2013),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/DR006/DR006/nonmedical-pain-reliever-use-
2013.htm [https://perma.cc/AB34-EFCU]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE
CTR., Narcotics, in NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2003 (2003),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs3/3300/pharm.htm [https://perma.cc/L5C3-P2WR]; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT
2011, at 37 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5CJ-CW7P].
 50. Shapiro, supra note 47. 
51. Id.
 52. Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring to Address the Overdose Crises:
Ideology Meets Reality, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 142 (2018). 
53. Rebecca L. Haffajee, Preventing Opioid Misuse with Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs: A Framework for Evaluating the Success of State Public Health Laws, 67 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1621, 1637 (2016). 
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What is clear is that PDMPs are extremely popular with law 
enforcement agencies, including the DEA. Several states expressly
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant to access PDMP data.54 
The DEA, however, contends that those state warrant requirements 
are preempted by the CSA.55 The DEA has broad power under the
CSA to issue administrative subpoenas to investigate drug crimes.56 
CSA § 876 subpoenas permit the DEA to access any and all records it 
finds relevant or material to a drug investigation without a court order.57 
The DEA’s widespread use of agency-issued administrative subpoenas 
to conduct warrantless searches of the myriad, individually identifying 
health information collected by PDMP databases raises serious Fourth
Amendment concerns. These concerns likely existed under 
longstanding Fourth Amendment case law. A recent Supreme Court 
decision, Carpenter v. United States,58 bolsters this contention. 
Carpenter held that the government must obtain a warrant to
access an individual’s historic cell-site-location information.59 
Carpenter and the Fourth Amendment doctrines central to its holding 
motivate this Article and animate its two core contentions. First, 
pertinent, pre-Carpenter precedent requires the DEA to obtain a 
warrant in order to conduct sweeps of state PDMP databases to search
patient prescribing information. Second, courts are even more likely to 
rule that warrantless DEA searches of such sensitive and revealing 
prescribing information run afoul of the Fourth Amendment in the 
post-Carpenter world. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief overview 
of the American drug-overdose crisis. It then chronicles the explosion 
of PDMPs created in response to that crisis and critiques the DEA’s 
ability to access and mine PDMP data without individualized suspicion,
probable cause, or judicial review under its CSA administrative-
subpoena authority. It maintains that the current framing of the U.S.
54. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR.,
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO PDMP REPORTS (Aug. 24, 2017),
http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/Law_Enforcement_Access_Methods_20170824.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V68Q-NYH9] (demonstrating that at least twenty-eight states require law enforcement
to obtain a warrant or court order to obtain PDMP data).
55. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2018). 
56. Id. § 876(a). 
57. Id. 
58. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
 59. See id. at 2217 n.3 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven
days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”).
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drug-overdose crisis has contributed to the development of law-
enforcement-centric public policy solutions, including overbroad and
potentially counterproductive prescription-drug surveillance. Part I 
further contends that state PDMPs are targets for abuse by overzealous 
law enforcement due to the troves of sensitive, individually identifying
health information that they collect and store. Part II examines two 
pre-Carpenter federal district court cases involving Fourth
Amendment challenges to DEA administrative subpoenas demanding
prescribing data from state PDMPs. Part III evaluates whether state 
PDMP health information is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection 
under applicable pre-Carpenter precedent. Part IV introduces and 
examines Carpenter. Part V applies Carpenter to DEA PDMP searches 
and concludes that PDMP prescribing data is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. It then concludes by identifying challenges to 
the analysis presented, including the potential application of the highly
regulated industries exception to the warrant requirement. 
I. THE RISE OF EXPANSIVE STATE PDMPS
It seems that, far more than prescribed opioids, the unpredictability 
of heroin and the turbocharged lethality of fentanyl have been a
prescription for an overdose disaster.60 
A. PDMP Provocation: The U.S. Drug-Overdose Crisis 
The United States is in the midst of an extravagant drug-overdose
crisis. According to the CDC, 70,237 Americans died of a drug 
overdose in 2017 alone.61 Moreover, over two-thirds of those deaths, or 
47,600 overdoses, involved an opioid.62 Drug-overdose deaths are now 
the most common cause of death for Americans under the age of fifty.63 
60. Sally Satel, The Myth of What’s Driving the Opioid Crisis: Doctor-Prescribed Painkillers 
Are Not the Biggest Threat, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2018/02/21/the-myth-of-the-roots-of-the-opioid-crisis-217034 [https://perma.cc/9MRU-
8S54].
 61. LAWRENCE SCHOLL, PUJA SETH, MBABAZI KARIISA, NANA WILSON & GRANT
BALDWIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &




 63. Josh Katz, You Draw It: Just How Bad Is the Drug Overdose Epidemic?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/14/upshot/drug-overdose-epidemic-
you-draw-it.html [https://perma.cc/9AQD-9TVH]. 
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The precise nature of the overdose crisis and its causes, however,
are hotly debated among prescribers, patients, politicians, and public-
health experts. This is likely because the prevailing mainstream
narrative—that the United States is suffering a prescription-opioid-
overdose crisis64 largely attributable to physician overprescribing65—is 
challenged by the evolving epidemiological data. Those data
demonstrate that (1) “deaths involving prescription painkillers have 
levelled off”;66 (2) opioid prescribing has decreased dramatically;67 (3) 
64. See, e.g., Haffajee, supra note 53, at 1622 (“The United States is in the midst of a 
prescription opioid misuse crisis.”); Bertha K. Madras, The Surge of Opioid Use, Addiction, and
Overdoses, 74 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 441, 441 (2017) (“Prescription opioids remain a primary
driver of opioid-related fatalities.”). 
65. See Dasgupta, Beletsky & Ciccarone, supra note 13, at 182 (“The accepted wisdom about 
the US opioid crisis singles out opioid analgesics as causative agents of harm, with physicians as
unwitting conduits and pharmaceutical companies as selfish promoters . . . .”); The Myth of an
Opioid Prescription Crisis, CATO INST. (Sept./Oct. 2017), https://www.cato.org/policy-
report/septemberoctober-2017/myth-opioid-prescription-crisis [https://perma.cc/A4Q3-FARJ]
(arguing that “only one-quarter of people who take opioids for nonmedical reasons get them by
obtaining a prescription,” “the opioid-related overdose rate for people who are on chronic pain
medicine under the guidance of a doctor is 0.2 percent,” and “that the big cause of overdose 
problems now is heroin”); Satel, supra note 60 (“The myth that the epidemic is driven by patients
becoming addicted to doctor-prescribed opioids . . . [which] is now a media staple and a plank in
nationwide litigation against drug makers . . . misconstrues the facts.”); see also, e.g., J. Baxter
Oliphant, Prescription Drug Abuse Increasingly Seen as U.S. Public Health Problem, PEW RES.
CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/prescription-drug-abuse-
increasingly-seen-as-a-major-u-s-public-health-problem/ [https://perma.cc/W65X-EKXW]
(pointing out that, in October 2017, “76% of the public sa[id] that prescription drug abuse is an
extremely or very serious problem in America”).
 66. Beletsky, supra note 52, at 139; see also Josh Katz, The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in
2016: Up 540% in Three Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2017/09/02/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/8QSC-
D2UB] (“There is a downward trend in deaths from prescription opioids alone.”); Maia Szalavitz,
Why Trump’s Opioid Plan Will Harm More People Than It Will Save, SELF (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.self.com/story/trump-opioid-plan [https://perma.cc/CD94-XS9S] (explaining that
“[d]octors are already prescribing opioids less frequently and reducing the average dose they’re
giving patients” and “[t]he most risky prescribing—high-dose opioid prescribing—was down
in 86.5 percent of U.S. counties since 2010”).
 67. See Dasgupta, Beletsky & Ciccarone, supra note 13, at 183 (“Overdose deaths
attributable to prescription opioids have not decreased proportionally to dispensing.”); IQVIA
INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SCIENCE, MEDICINE USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF
2017 AND OUTLOOK TO 2022, at 20 (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.iqvia.com/ 
institute/reports/medicine-use-and-spending-in-the-us-review-of-2017-outlook-to-2022 
[https://perma.cc/YK64-HSE9] (explaining that prescription-opioid volumes peaked in 2011 
and have since declined by 29 percent, and that 23.3 billion fewer morphine milligram equivalents
were dispensed to patients on a volume basis in 2017); Szalavitz, supra note 66 (notwithstanding
the fact that “[t]he number of overall opioid prescriptions . . . has been falling for years . . . opioid
overdose deaths in 30 states actually increased between 2010 and 2015, largely because of people 
switching to illegal drugs”).
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790 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:775
overdose deaths continue to rise;68 and (4) overdose deaths are
increasingly driven by the consumption of illicit opioids, such as street 
heroin and fentanyl,69 as well as benzodiazepines, cocaine, and 
methamphetamine.70 In fact, the rate of drug-overdose deaths 
involving fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and tramadol doubled from 2015 
to 201671 and was up 540 percent over the three-year period from 2014 
to 2016.72 Annual overdose deaths involving benzodiazepines, cocaine,
and methamphetamine—often in combination with an opioid—also
have spiked since 1999.73 
Media coverage of the opioid crisis has thus been “marred by a
false narrative that suggests most addictions start among pain patients
who become ‘accidentally’ addicted, when in reality, nearly 75 percent 
of those who begin misusing prescription drugs do not get those
substances directly from doctors.”74 The CDC recently acknowledged
68. John Gramlich, As Fatal Overdoses Rise, Many Americans See Drug Addiction as a Major 
Problem in Their Community, PEW RES. CTR. (May 30, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/05/30/as-fatal-overdoses-rise-many-americans-see-drug-addiction-as-a-major-
problem-in-their-community [https://perma.cc/6DCU-4PDA] (“Nationally, more than 63,600
people died of a drug overdose in 2016, the most recent year for which full data are available. . . .
That’s an increase of 21% from the prior year and nearly double the 34,425 drug overdose deaths
that occurred a decade earlier.”).
 69. See Puja Seth, Rose A. Rudd, Rita K. Noonan & Tamara M. Haegerich, Quantifying the
Epidemic of Prescription Opioid Overdose Deaths, 108 AM. J. PUB. Health 500, 500 (2018) (“From
2013 to 2014, fentanyl submissions increased by 426%. The increases were strongly correlated
with increases in synthetic opioid deaths but not with pharmaceutical fentanyl prescribing rates,
suggesting that the increases were largely due to [illicitly manufactured fentanyl].”); see also Katz, 
supra note 66 (“Drug overdoses are expected to remain the leading cause of death of Americans
under 50, as synthetic opioids – primarily fentanyl and its analogues – continue to push the death
count higher.”). 
70. See, e.g., OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2017 OHIO DRUG OVERDOSE DATA: GENERAL
FINDINGS 2 (2017), https://odh.ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/5deb684e-4667-4836-862b-
cb5eb59acbd3/2017_OhioDrugOverdoseReport.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/GCR7-
DZN4] (“Cocaine-related overdose deaths as well as deaths involving methamphetamine/other
psychostimulants increased substantially in 2017, and many of these deaths also involved an
opioid like fentanyl and related drugs . . . .”); Benzodiazepines and Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON 
DRUG ABUSE (Mar. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/benzodiazepines-
opioids [https://perma.cc/AH4V-UCN5] (“More than 30 percent of overdoses involving opioids
also involve benzodiazepines, a type of prescription sedative commonly prescribed for anxiety or
to help with insomnia.”).
71. Hedegaard, Warner & Miniño, supra note 3, at 5.
 72. Katz, supra note 63.
 73. See Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://
perma.cc/7943-YWZK] (featuring figures showing the increase in overdose deaths from various
drugs from 1999 to 2017). 
74. Szalavitz, supra note 66. 
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that it has perpetuated this narrative by overattributing opioid-
overdose deaths to prescription painkillers. In an April 2018 article, the 
CDC conceded that it “[t]raditionally . . . includ[ed] synthetic opioid
deaths in estimates of ‘prescription’ opioid deaths” and that such
methodology overestimated the number of Americans who succumbed 
to prescription-opioid overdoses at 32,445 in 2016.75 Using an updated 
methodology, which included “deaths involving only natural[,] 
semisynthetic opioids and methadone,” the CDC ratcheted down its 
2016 prescription-opioid-overdose death toll to 17,087 Americans, 
approximately 53 percent of its initial count.76 
In July 2018, Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb issued a series of tweets acknowledging that the “opioid crisis 
[has] evol[ved] from an epidemic mostly involving prescription drugs 
to one that’s increasingly fueled by illicit substances being purchased 
online or off the street.”77 He also admitted that “actions taken to 
curtail opioid abuse and misuse in one part of the market can be
thwarted as demand shifts to other, even more dangerous channels.”78 
A recent Politico article took a similar view, explaining that 
multiple surveys . . . show that only a minority of people who are 
prescribed opioids for pain become addicted to them, and those who 
do become addicted and who die from painkiller overdoses tend to
obtain these medications from sources other than their own
physicians. Within the past several years, overdose deaths are
overwhelmingly attributable not to prescription opioids but to illicit 
fentanyl and heroin. These “street opioids” have become the engine
of the opioid crisis in its current, most lethal form. If we are to devise
sound solutions to this overdose epidemic, we must understand and
acknowledge this truth about its nature.79 
Notwithstanding the epidemiological data and expert commentary
about the ever-evolving nature of the American drug-overdose crisis,
75. Seth et al., supra note 69, at 500.
 76. Id.
77. Scott Gottlieb (@SGottliebFDA), TWITTER (July 1, 2018, 7:39 AM),
https://twitter.com/SGottliebFDA/status/1013431855465598976 [https://perma.cc/32GG-4XTU];
see also Jeffery A. Singer, FDA Commissioner Gottlieb’s Sunday “Tweetorial” Is Both
Encouraging and Frustrating, CATO INST. (July 2, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/fda-
commissioner-gottliebs-sunday-tweetorial-both-encouraging-frustrating [https://perma.cc/5EDF-
MJFC] (“[T]he overdose crisis has always been primarily caused by non-medical users accessing
drugs in a dangerous black market fueled by drug prohibition.”).
 78. Gottlieb, supra note 77. 
79. Satel, supra note 60.
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792 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:775
the media, policymakers, and even certain high-profile physicians 
continue to perpetuate the false narrative that the county’s 
skyrocketing drug-related death rate is primarily fueled by prescription
opioids. Needless to say, ill-defined public-health problems beget 
poorly designed and targeted public-health interventions. In this 
particular instance, the prescription-opioid narrative has provoked— 
and continues to encourage—supply-side, prescription-drug 
surveillance-centric responses to the crisis, including the ubiquitous 
adoption of privacy-intrusive PDMPs, with little consideration about
those policies’ potentially harmful collateral consequences.
B. PDMP Overview 
PDMPs are state-administered electronic databases that collect, 
analyze, and make available prescription information on controlled 
substances dispensed by pharmacies and prescribers to “authorized 
users,” such as physicians, dispensers, and state pharmaceutical and
medical professional boards.80 These databases often track all 
substances enumerated in Schedules II through V of the CSA as well 
as other nonscheduled “drugs of concern.”81 PDMPs are administered 
across jurisdictions by a wide variety of distinct state agencies ranging
from state pharmacy and licensing boards to departments of health and
law enforcement entities.82 
Although the particularities pertaining to PDMP data collection 
differ among states, all jurisdictions collect the following information
from dispensers: “[t]ype of drug dispensed,” “[q]uantity of drug 
dispensed,” “[n]umber of days a given quantity is supposed to last,” 
“[d]ate dispensed,” “prescriber and pharmacy identifiers,” and 
“[p]atient identifiers,” such as “name, address, zip code, and date of 
birth.”83 
80. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs: A Guide for Healthcare Providers, IN BRIEF, Winter 2017, at 1.
 81. See PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE 
CTR., DRUGS MONITORED BY PDMP (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_Substances_Tracked_20171205.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q8BV-BG5J] (showing state PDMP monitoring schemes). 
82. See PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE 
CTR., PDMP BY OPERATING STATE AGENCY TYPE (Aug. 24, 2017), 
http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_Agency_Type_20170824.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YST-
QYMW] (showing the state agencies used to operate PDMP programs).
 83. SAMHSA, CTR. FOR THE APPLICATION OF PREVENTION TECHNOLOGIES, USING
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM DATA TO SUPPORT PREVENTION PLANNING, 1,
2 & n.3, https://www.edc.org/sites/default/files/uploads/pdmp-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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The majority of states mandate PDMP enrollment for prescribers 
or dispensers or both—the so-called “registration mandate.”84 A 
smaller number require that medical providers query the database— 
the “use mandate”—if they either suspect drug misuse or satisfy other
objective criteria, such as the prescribing or dispensing of certain
controlled substances or certain dosages of particular drugs.85 
The fact that the majority of state PDMPs do not even require 
prescribers to query patient data proves that the databases are largely
criminal and regulatory surveillance tools dressed up in public-health-
promoting rhetoric.86 The express purpose of these drug monitoring
programs is to help enforcement agencies “identify problem patients, 
rogue prescribers, and pharmacists who may be diverting potentially
addictive and otherwise risky drugs”87 and, thereby, “deter ‘aberrant’ 
practices”88 “in an effort to reduce prescription drug abuse.”89 
According to the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and
Technical Assistance Center (“TAC”), the “overriding goal of PDMPs
is to uphold both the state laws ensuring access to appropriate 
pharmaceutical care by citizens and the state laws deterring 
diversion”90 of controlled substances. 
More troubling, there is little evidence that even the state PDMPs 
that mandate prescriber use “ensure[] access to appropriate 
pharmaceutical care,” “enhance patient care” or “assist in developing 
4X7X-EJBJ].  
84. See PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE 
CTR., PDMP MANDATORY ENROLLMENT OF PRESCRIBERS AND DISPENSERS (Aug. 2018), 
http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/Mandatory_Enrollment_20180801.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4UG-
LKDB] (showing that forty states plus Guam have implemented a registration mandate). 
85. See PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE 
CTR., CRITERIA FOR MANDATORY QUERY OF PDMP (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.pdmpassist.org/ 
pdf/Mandatory_Query_Conditions_20180102.pdf [https://perma.cc/USS5-25LJ] (outlining state-
by-state mandatory-query criteria).
 86. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR.,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE: HISTORY OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS
2 (Mar. 2018) [hereinafter HISTORY OF PDMPS], http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/ 
PDMP_admin/TAG_History_PDMPs_final_20180314.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7VX-CLWX]
(“The earliest PDMPs were established primarily as enforcement and regulatory tools providing
data to officials responsible for enforcing drug laws and overseeing the prescribing and dispensing
of these drugs by health care professionals.”). 
87. Beletsky, supra note 52, at 140.
 88. Id.
 89. Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information
Privacy, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975, 989 (2016); see also HISTORY OF PDMPS, supra note 86, at 2.
 90. HISTORY OF PDMPS, supra note 86, at 2.
OLIVA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2019 3:50 PM        










     
 
 
    
  
  
    






   
     
  
794 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:775
drug abuse prevention and treatment strategies.”91 “Although 
mandates are not meant to deter opioid prescribing per se, resistant 
clinicians may simply decline to prescribe opioids, raise prescribing 
thresholds, refer patients elsewhere, or substitute to non-monitored
drugs—all of which could compromise appropriate symptom 
management.”92 PDMP mandates, in other words, “pressure[] doctors
to cut back on prescribing, and then their legitimately suffering patients 
are driven to the illegal market where they get laced opioids, or they 
go to cheaper heroin and, of course, that is where the overdoses 
occur.”93 
A recent summary of various studies examining the effects of 
PDMPs pointed to research indicating that prescription-drug 
surveillance was neither associated with decreases in nonmedical use 
of controlled substances nor reductions in drug-overdose mortality
rates.94 One of those studies, in fact, concluded that “implementation 
of PDMPs was associated with an 11 percent increase in drug overdose 
mortality.”95 “Rising overdose mortality[,] despite decreasing opioid
prescribing[,] suggests that merely reducing the prescription-opioid 
supply will have little positive short-term impact. Reducing prescribing 
could even increase the death toll as people with opioid use disorder 
or untreated pain shift into the unstable, illicit drug market.”96 In sum,
PDMPs may operate to put additional lives at risk by incentivizing 
opioid patients to opt out of the health-care delivery system to avoid
law enforcement surveillance and possible prosecution. 
91. Haffajee, supra note 53, at 1621 (explaining that “PDMP policies are widespread . . .
[and] largely uninformed by robust evidence or a systematic assessment of best practices” and
“[w]hether [PDMPs] successfully reduce opioid misuse and overdoes remains unclear”). 
92. Rebecca L. Haffajee, Anupam B. Jena & Scott G. Weiner, Mandatory Use of 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 313 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 891, 892 (2015).
 93. The Myth of an Opioid Prescription Crisis, supra note 65. 
94. JANET WEINER, YUHUA BAO & ZACHARY MEISEL, PENN LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF 
HEALTH ECON., PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS: EVOLUTION AND EVIDENCE
5 (June 8, 2017), https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/prescription-drug-monitoring-programs-evolution-
and-evidence [https://perma.cc/D4YR-GT5Y].
95. Guohua Li et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring and Drug Overdose Mortality, INJURY 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 3 (2014), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186%2F2197-1714-1-9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M97C-2YZZ].
96. Sarah E. Wakeman & Michael L. Barnett, Primary Care and the Opioid-Overdose Crisis: 
Buprenorphine Myths and Realities, 397 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2018); The Myth of an Opioid
Prescription Crisis, supra note 65. 
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C. Law Enforcement Access to PDMP Data 
The DEA has repeatedly invoked its authority to conduct 
warrantless searches of patient prescribing data by issuing 
administrative subpoenas to state PDMPs pursuant to the CSA.97 The
CSA expressly empowers the DEA to self-issue administrative 
subpoenas to investigate drug crimes.98 Under § 876 of the Act, the
DEA “may subpoena witnesses, compel the attendance and testimony
of witnesses, and require the production of any records (including 
books, papers, documents, and other tangible things which constitute
or contain evidence) which the [agency] finds relevant or material to 
the investigation.”99 DEA administrative subpoenas are not subject to
a probable cause requirement, are issued without court scrutiny or 
approval, and are judicially enforceable “to compel [the] compliance” 
of recipients.100 
The DEA concedes that it frequently utilizes administrative 
subpoenas to search state PDMP databases,101 including in states that 
require law enforcement to secure a warrant in order to access PDMP
information.102 Because PDMP prescribing information is highly 
sensitive, state agencies, prescribers, and patients in at least three 
jurisdictions have challenged the DEA’s self-issuance of these general-
warrant-like subpoenas on Fourth Amendment and due process 
grounds.103 To date, the DEA has successfully invoked, among other 
things, federal preemption defenses and the Fourth Amendment third-
party doctrine,104 which has traditionally held that a person forfeits any
97. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2018). 
98. Id. § 876(a). 
99. Id.
 100. Id. § 876(c). 
101. Declaration of Diversion Investigator Robert Churchwell at 3, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868 (D. Utah July 27, 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-611) (conceding
that “[w]hen examining and reviewing the prescribing activities of a DEA registrant, one of the
principle investigative resources available to DEA investigative personnel is information 
contained within the Prescription Database Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) of the various
states”).
102. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 860 F.3d 1228,
1234 (9th Cir. 2017). 
103. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Ricco Jonas, No. 18-mc-56-LM, 2018 WL 6718579 (D.N.H. Nov. 
1, 2018), adopted by No. 19-cv-030-LM, 2019 WL 251246 (D.N.H. Jan. 17, 2019); Utah Dep’t of
Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868; Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t
Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017). 
104. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 860 F.3d at 1234–35; Utah Dep’t of 
Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *6–9.
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privacy interest or property right in information that she voluntarily
turns over to a third party.105 
II. PRE-CARPENTER PDMP LITIGATION: OREGON & UTAH CASES
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Carpenter decision, the federal
courts only had two occasions to examine the constitutionality of a
DEA § 876 subpoena seeking data without a warrant from a state
PDMP. Those cases were provoked by the Oregon and Utah PDMPs’ 
refusals to comply with DEA administrative subpoenas pursuant to
their respective states’ statutory mandates denying law enforcement 
access to PDMP data without a warrant supported by probable cause.
A thorough examination of the merits of the legal arguments raised in
those cases first requires an overview of the pertinent Fourth
Amendment and related legal doctrines on which the parties relied, 
which is provided in the following Section. 
A. Fourth Amendment Overview 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”106 The basic purpose of the
Amendment is to safeguard “the privacy, dignity, and security
of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the
Government, without regard to whether the government actor is 
investigating crime or performing another function.”107 In other words,
105. The most recent case, United States Department of Justice v. Ricco Jonas, is the only 
PDMP case that the DEA filed post-Carpenter. Ricco Jonas, 2018 WL 6718579, at *1. The Ricco
Jonas litigation was provoked by the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy’s refusal to comply with
a DEA § 876 subpoena seeking access to the state’s PDMP data based on, among other things,
the state’s warrant requirement for law enforcement access to the database. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 318-B:35, I(b)(3) (2019) (providing that access to PDMP data shall be given to
“[a]uthorized law enforcement officials on a case-by-case basis for the purpose of investigation
and prosecution of a criminal offense when presented with a court order based on probable cause,” 
meaning that “[n]o law enforcement agency or official shall have direct access to query program
information” (emphasis added)). The Board lost before the United States District Court for the 
District of New Hampshire and the case is currently on appeal before the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. Ricco Jonas, 2018 WL 6718579, at *7. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
107. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755–56 (2010); see also Camara v. Mun. Court of 
S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 












    
      
 
    
    
 
  
   
     
 
  
   
      
    
    
 
 
     




     
   
 7972020] PRESCRIPTION-DRUG POLICING
the Fourth Amendment “applies equally to civil and criminal law 
enforcement.”108 
Traditionally, courts interpreted the Fourth Amendment from a 
property-centric perspective and, as such, required an individual
seeking its protection to establish that she had suffered a physical 
invasion of—or a trespass to—her private property at the hands of the 
government.109 Constitutional jurisprudence, however, has evolved and
now provides a second path for those who seek sanctuary in the skirts 
of the Fourth Amendment: the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
outlined by Justice Harlan in his Katz v. United States110 concurrence.111 
The question in Katz was whether the FBI’s use of a listening 
device attached to a phone booth to intercept the petitioner’s 
telephone calls constituted a “search” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.112 The Katz Court answered that question in the affirmative
and rejected the traditional notion that a Fourth Amendment “search”
is limited to instances that involve a “physical intrusion” into a 
“constitutionally protected area.”113 In doing so, the Court famously
asserted that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”114 
108. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758
(1994). 
109. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (2012)
(explaining property law’s longstanding “stranglehold on Fourth Amendment doctrine”); Jace C. 
Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United States v. Jones—A Case of
Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 697 (2013) (“Historically, the doctrinal definition of a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment involved some physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area and, thus, trespass became the driving force behind Fourth
Amendment protection.”); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 423 (2007) (“Prior to Katz, the Court largely
defined a search as a function of some physical invasion by the government.”). 
110. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
 111. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61
STAN. L. REV. 101, 105 (2008) (asserting that Katz “untethered” the Fourth Amendment from
“the law of trespass”). 
112. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
 113. Id. at 350–53; see also id. at 353 (“The premise that property interests control the right of
the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 304 (1967)).
 114. Id. at 351; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). As legal commentators have argued,
“the Fourth Amendment’s text both explicitly and implicitly addresses privacy rights. The explicit
recognition of privacy rights arises from the enumeration of the people’s right [t]o be secure in
their persons [and] papers.” Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz & Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth
Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure
Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 6 (2013). Moreover, “[i]mplicit
recognition of the right to privacy, and a basis for its protections in an evolving technological
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Justice Harlan concurred with that sentiment and created a two-
pronged test, which provides that a Fourth Amendment search has 
occurred when (1) an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the items or area searched and (2) society recognizes that 
expectation as objectively reasonable.115 
The Supreme Court adopted Justice Harlan’s privacy test a dozen 
years later in Smith v. Maryland.116 The Smith Court did not just invoke
the test; rather, it applied its principles to arrive at the Court’s most 
expansive interpretation of the third-party doctrine.117 As the Court 
explained, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” and thus, no
right to invoke the Fourth Amendment to protect such information 
from search or seizure.118 The Smith Court went on to hold that the
petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in information he 
had voluntarily turned over to his telephone company.119 
The evolution of the Katz test and the third-party doctrine are 
critical to understanding the arguments advanced by the parties in the
Oregon and Utah PDMP cases. An additional line of cases that involve 
the standard applicable to administrative subpoenas, including 
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling120 and United States v. 
environment, can also be found in the final enumerated term: the security of one’s ‘effects.’” Id.
at 7.
 115. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979).
 117. Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of
the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1930–31 (2017) (explaining that
“[t]he third party doctrine has remained relatively undisturbed in the years since Smith” and 
“[o]ver time, it seems that the Smith inquiry and its application has calcified into a binary one, in
which any information disclosed to a third party for any reason is public and does not merit Fourth
Amendment protection”). As this Article further points out, even Stephen Sachs, the then-
Attorney General who argued Smith on behalf of the State of Maryland in 1979, has
acknowledged how dangerously expansive the decision is—and has become—in the modern day.
Id. at 1933 (citing 1979 Supreme Court Ruling Becomes Focus of NSA Tactics, NPR (Dec. 21, 
2013, 5:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/21/256114227/1979-supreme-court-ruling-becomes-
focus-of-nsa-tactics [https://perma.cc/38QB-4CSX] (pointing out that Sachs told NPR that “[t]he 
current situation is really a far cry from the world in 1979. . . . The massive intrusion now is world’s
[sic] apart from what we argued in 1979. . . . I don’t even like the notion that this is part of my
legacy”).
 118. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
119. Id. at 747.
120. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). 
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Morton Salt Co.,121 was particularly important in the Utah litigation.122 
In lockstep with those decisions, the Tenth Circuit held in Becker v.
Kroll123 that “an investigatory or administrative subpoena is not subject 
to the same probable cause requirements as a search warrant.”124 
Instead, “the Fourth Amendment requires only that a subpoena be 
‘sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in
directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.’”125 
As explained below, the Utah district court relied on Becker’s 
“reasonable relevance” test in its decision to enforce the DEA’s § 876
subpoena.
B. Oregon PDMP v. U.S. DEA126 
The Oregon legislature created its statewide PDMP in 2009.127 
Oregon’s PDMP statute requires all in-state pharmacies to report the 
following information to its electronic database upon dispensing any 
Schedule II–IV drug: (1) the name, address, and date of birth of the
patient; (2) the identification of the pharmacy; (3) the identification of
the practitioner who prescribed the drug; (4) the identification of the 
drug; (5) the date of the prescription; (6) the date the drug was 
dispensed; and (7) the quantity of the drug dispensed.128 “The primary
purpose of the PDMP is to provide practitioners and pharmacists a tool 
to improve health care, by providing health care providers with a 
means to identify and address problems related to the side effects of
drugs, risks associated with the combined effects of prescription drugs 
. . . and overdose.”129 
Oregon’s PDMP statute expressly provides that prescription 
monitoring data constitutes protected health information (“PHI”) and, 
121. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
122. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868, at
*5 (D. Utah July 27, 2017).
123. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2007).
 124. Id. at 916 (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)). 
125. Id.
126. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 860 F.3d 1228
(9th Cir. 2017). 
127. See OR. REV. STAT. § 431.962 (2014).
 128. Id. § 431.964(1)(a)–(g); see also Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug
Enf’t Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 960 (D. Or. 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017).
 129. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (citation omitted)
(quotations omitted).
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as such, is subject only to limited disclosure.130 In fact, neither 
physicians nor pharmacists may access PDMP data unless they 
“certif[y] that the requested information is for the purpose of 
evaluating the need for or providing medical or pharmaceutical 
treatment for a patient to whom the practitioner or pharmacist 
anticipates providing, is providing or has provided care.”131 The statute 
also prohibits the PDMP custodian from disclosing prescribing data to 
law enforcement without a warrant.132 
Notwithstanding that warrant requirement, the DEA served at
least two separate § 876 administrative subpoenas on the Oregon
PDMP in 2012.133 The first, which was served on September 11, 2012, 
requested an individual patient’s prescribing information.134 The 
second, which was served six days later, demanded a “summary of all 
prescription drugs prescribed by two physicians.”135 
The Oregon PDMP refused to comply with those administrative 
subpoenas.136 Instead, it filed a complaint in federal district court
seeking a declaration that “it cannot be compelled to disclose an 
individual’s protected health information to the DEA pursuant to an 
administrative subpoena unless so ordered by a federal court.”137 
Shortly thereafter, the American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, four 
John Doe patients, and Dr. James Roe intervened in the action and
challenged the DEA’s issuance of the subpoenas on Fourth
Amendment grounds.138 
The district court analyzed the parties’ Fourth Amendment claim
under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. The court 
130. OR. REV. STAT. § 431.966(1)(a)(A) (2014) (expressly stating that “prescription
monitoring information submitted . . . to the prescription monitoring program . . . [i]s protected
health information”).
 131. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (quoting OR. REV.
STAT. § 431.966(2)(a)).
 132. OR. REV. STAT. § 431.966(2)(a)(G) (providing that the PDMP may disclose such
information only “[p]ursuant to a valid court order based on probable cause and issued at the 
request of a federal, state or local law enforcement agency engaged in an authorized drug-related
investigation involving a person to whom the requested information pertains”).
133. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Or. 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (No. 3:12-cv-12-2023).
134. Declaration of Nina Englander in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Or. 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (No. 3:12-cv-12-2023). 
135. Id.
 136. Id.
137. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 4, Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 
998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (No. 3:12-cv-12-2023).
 138. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
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acknowledged that the intervenors were entitled to “invoke the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment” if they could show that “they 
have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and . . . that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”139 With regard to the first prong of the Katz test, the 
court determined that “each of the patient intervenors has a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his prescription information, as would nearly 
any person who has used prescription drugs.”140 The court had 
forecasted that outcome earlier in its opinion when it acknowledged 
that 
depending on the drug prescribed, the information reported to PDMP 
can reveal a great deal of information regarding a particular patient 
including the condition treated by the prescribed drug. Schedule II– 
IV drugs can be used to treat a multitude of medical conditions 
including AIDS, psychiatric disorders, chronic pain, drug or alcohol 
addiction, and gender identity disorder.141 
The court also held that physician–intervenor James Roe had “a
subjective expectation of privacy in his prescribing information.”142 In 
reaching that conclusion, the court pointed to Dr. Roe’s declaration,
which “describ[ed] his duty of confidentiality to his patients and how 
law enforcement has made doctors, including himself, reluctant to 
prescribe schedule II–IV drugs where medically indicated.”143 The
court further explained that “the DEA inserts itself into a decision that 
should ordinarily be left to the doctor and his or her patient” when it
surveils prescribing data.144 
The Oregon district court then proceeded to the second prong of
Katz, which queries whether society is prepared to recognize the
intervenors’ subjective expectations of privacy as objectively 
reasonable. The court explained that “[m]edical records, of which 
prescription records form a not insignificant part, have long been 
treated with confidentiality.”145 It supported that statement by pointing
to the ancient Hippocratic Oath, the Health Insurance Portability and
139. Id. at 964 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
 140. Id. at 964.
 141. Id. at 960.
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Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule,146 and the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden,147 which held that 
“all provision of medical services in private physicians’ offices carries
with it a high expectation of privacy for both physician and patient.”148 
Ultimately, the “court easily conclude[d] that the intervenors’
subjective expectation of privacy in their prescription information
[wa]s objectively reasonable.”149 According to the court, 
it is more than reasonable for patients to believe that law enforcement
agencies will not have unfettered access to their records. . . . By
obtaining the prescription records for [certain intervenors], a person
would know that they have used testosterone in particular quantities 
and by extension, that they have gender identity disorder and are
treating it through hormone therapy. It is difficult to conceive of 
information that is more private or more deserving of Fourth
Amendment protection.150 
The court also rejected the DEA’s argument that the third-party
doctrine undermined the intervenors’ reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their prescribing data.151 In so doing, the court distinguished 
the leading third-party doctrine cases: United States v. Miller152 and 
Smith. First, the court explained that PDMP records are “more
inherently personal or private”153 than the bank records in Miller and 
the dialed telephone numbers in Smith and, as such, are “entitled to 
and treated with a heightened expectation of privacy.”154 Second, it 
pointed out that, while Miller and Smith largely turned on the
voluntary conveyance of the information at issue in those cases, 
“patients and doctors are not voluntarily conveying information to the 
PDMP” because those conveyances are “required by law.”155 
The DEA appealed the district court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit. 
The appellate court, however, held that the intervenors lacked standing 
to raise Fourth Amendment claims because they were not the targets
146. Id.
147. Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
 148. Id. at 550.
 149. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
 150. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
 151. Id. at 967.
152. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
 153. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (quoting United 
States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012)).
 154. Id.
 155. Id.
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of the DEA subpoenas at issue.156 Although it was precluded from
reaching the merits of the intervenors’ Fourth Amendment challenge 
as a result of its standing determination, the Ninth Circuit did
“acknowledge the particularly private nature of the medical 
information at issue.”157 The court also denied the Oregon PDMP’s 
request for declaratory relief, which did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, on the theory that the Oregon warrant requirement was 
preempted by the CSA.158 
C. DOJ v. Utah DOC159 
Approximately four weeks after the Ninth Circuit decided the 
Oregon PDMP case, a Utah federal district court issued a decision 
based on similar facts. Utah created its state PDMP, which is 
administered by the Utah Department of Commerce (“DOC”), in 
1995.160 Utah’s PDMP contains record data about “every prescription 
for a controlled substance dispensed in the state to any individual other 
than an inpatient in a licensed health care facility.”161 Specifically, Utah
requires all nonhospital dispensers to electronically report the 
following information to its PDMP: (1) the name, date of birth, gender, 
and street address of the patient; (2) positive identification information 
for the patient; (3) the name of the prescriber; (4) the name of the drug; 
and (5) the strength, quantity, and dosage of the drug dispensed.162 
On November 12, 2015, the DEA served an administrative
subpoena on the Utah DOC requesting “all prescription records 
associated with DEA Registrant #1 for the time period of January 8, 
2015 to present,”163 including “all controlled substance prescriptions 
issued by the subject of the investigation and to whom these
prescriptions were issued.”164 Much like Oregon, Utah’s PDMP 
enabling statute requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant to access 
156. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 860 F.3d 1228,
1234–35 (9th Cir. 2017).
 157. Id. at 1235. 
158. Id. at 1236. 
159. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868 (D.
Utah July 27, 2017).
 160. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37f-101–801 (West 2016).
 161. Id. § 58-37f-201(5)(a); Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *3. 
162. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-203(3); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R156-37f-203(1)(a) (2019).
163. Declaration of Diversion Investigator Robert Churchwell at 4, Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 
2017 WL 3189868.
 164. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *3. 
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PDMP data.165 The Utah DOC, therefore, refused to comply with the
administrative subpoena.166 The DEA responded by filing a petition to
enforce the subpoena in federal district court.167 Several parties 
intervened in the action as respondents opposed to the DEA’s petition, 
including the Salt Lake County Firefighters, Equality Utah, American
Civil Liberties Union of Utah, and two John Doe patients.168 
As alluded to previously, the Utah district court held that the 
DEA’s administrative subpoena was subject to the Becker v. Kroll169 
“reasonable relevance test.”170 In Becker, the Tenth Circuit held that 
administrative investigatory subpoenas were not subject to the same
threshold requirements as a Fourth Amendment warrant.171 Instead,
such subpoenas pass muster so long as they are “sufficiently limited in
scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance
will not be unreasonably burdensome.”172 Because the DEA subpoena 
at issue in the Utah PDMP litigation only “requested records for one
specific physician for a limited time period,” “[wa]s relevant in 
purpose,” “[wa]s specific in directive,” and was in response to an
ongoing investigation, the district court found that it easily satisfied the 
reasonable relevance test.173 
The court then evaluated whether the Utah patients and 
prescribers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their PDMP 
data. Although the court acknowledged that “[m]edical records, 
including prescriptions, are no doubt personal and private matters,” it 
concluded that the “expectation of privacy analysis nonetheless weighs 
in the DEA’s favor,” relying on the third-party doctrine and the highly
regulated industries exception to the Fourth Amendment.174 
165. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-301(2)(m) (stating that the Utah DOC is prohibited from
disclosing PDMP data to law enforcement unless it is presented with a “valid search warrant . . .
related to: (i) one or more controlled substances; and (ii) a specific person who is a subject of the 
investigation”); see also UTAH ADMIN. CODE R156-37f-301(5)(a) (“Federal, state and local law
enforcement authorities and state and local prosecutors requesting information from the
[PDMP] . . . shall provide a valid search warrant authorized by the courts . . . .”); Utah Dep’t of 
Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1 (“[T]he State claims the Utah Controlled Substance Database
Act (the ‘Database Act’) requires a warrant for law enforcement searches of the Database.”). 
166. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *3. 
167. Id.
 168. Id. at *1. 
169. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2007).
 170. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *7. 
171. Becker, 494 F.3d at 916. 
172. Id. (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)).
 173. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *7. 
174. Id. at *8. 
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 8052020] PRESCRIPTION-DRUG POLICING
Consequently, the court granted the DEA’s petition to enforce the 
subpoena.175 
III. EVALUATING THE PDMP CASES UNDER PRE-CARPENTER 
PRECEDENT
The DEA advanced several arguments in its campaign to enforce 
the administrative subpoenas it served on the Oregon and Utah
PDMPs. Specifically, the DEA argued that its administrative 
investigatory subpoena was exempt from the Fourth Amendment 
probable cause standard, the CSA preempted the states’ warrant 
requirements, patients lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their prescribing data, and the third-party doctrine exempted the 
agency from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. This 
Section describes and dissects each of those contentions. In so doing, it 
argues that the Oregon district court reached the correct result and the 
Utah case was wrongly decided under the applicable pre-Carpenter
precedent.
A. Pre-Carpenter Administrative-Subpoena Cases 
The Supreme Court has deemed “searches conducted outside the 
judicial process . . . per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”176 and has 
generally required individualized suspicion for warrantless searches.177 
There is a line of pre-Carpenter decisions, however, that hold that 
certain investigatory or administrative subpoenas are not subject to the
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement. Under those cases,
which trace their lineage to Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. 
Walling178 and United States v. Morton Salt Co.,179 “when an 
175. Id. at *9. 
176. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
177. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
 178. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946) (determining that the 
administrator of the FTC’s “investigative function” is “essentially the same as the grand jury’s, or
the court’s in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the
same limitations . . . that he shall not act arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority” but 
recognizing that “this does not mean that his inquiry must be ‘limited . . . by forecasts of the 
probable result of the investigation. . . .’” (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1919))). 
179. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (recognizing that “a
governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so
unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power” but opining
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administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the 
Fourth Amendment requires [only] that the subpoena be sufficiently
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that 
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.”180 
The DEA based its authority to conduct warrantless searches of 
Oregon and Utah PDMP data primarily on these grounds and, in fact, 
prevailed on that argument in the Utah litigation. There, the DEA 
contended that that the court’s role in reviewing an agency’s petition 
to enforce an administrative subpoena is “strictly limited” to the
reasonable relevance test.181 As explained above, the Utah district 
court agreed and held that the DEA subpoena at issue easily satisfied 
that lenient standard of review.182 
There are, however, at least two reasons to question whether the 
district court applied the right test in reaching its ruling in the Utah 
PDMP case. First, the cases on which the court relied in applying the 
reasonable relevance test are of suspect applicability because they 
expressly limit their holdings to administrative subpoenas seeking 
corporate books or records.183 The prescribing data stored in state
PDMPs, however, are patients’ private health records—not corporate
records. Second, the state agencies from which the DEA sought 
records in the PDMP cases are not corporations. Rather, they are 
that “it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too 
indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant” (citation omitted)).
180. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) (emphasis added).
181. Memorandum in Support of Petition to Enforce DEA Administrative Subpoenas at 4,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611 (D. Utah June 14, 2016)
(quoting United States v. Zadeh, 820 F.3d 746, 757 (5th Cir. 2016)). The DEA raised the same
argument in the Oregon PDMP litigation. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v.
United States Drug Enf’t Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (D. Or. 2014) (characterizing the
DEA’s argument), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017).
 182. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *7. 
183. See Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 651–52 (limiting its Fourth Amendment inquiry to the 
request for corporate records); Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 210; (“The only records or documents
sought were corporate ones.”); see also Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 816 (2005) (“[A]ll of these [early twentieth-century-administrative
subpoena] cases involved government attempts to obtain corporate or other business documents.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Court had intimated that subpoenas for
private records might have to meet a higher standard.”); Katherine Scherb, Comment,
Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial Records: What Protection for Privacy Does the
Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1075, 1085 (“The Supreme Court decisions of the 
1940s and 1950s which developed the current Fourth Amendment standard for administrative
subpoenas addressed administrative subpoenas seeking corporate records.”).

















    




   
  
 






 8072020] PRESCRIPTION-DRUG POLICING
“government actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment.”184 
1. State PDMP Data Are Not Corporate Books or Records. The 
PDMP records sought by the DEA in the Utah and Oregon cases are 
distinguishable from the corporate books and records subpoenaed in
Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt. State PDMPs are populated with 
prescriber, dispenser, and patient health-care data, all of which are 
uploaded to the databases by dispensers subject to a state mandate and 
much of which is derived from confidential patient–physician
communications. This is important because the Supreme Court has
long distinguished between the Fourth Amendment rights that pertain 
to corporations and those that apply to private individuals.185 
In Oklahoma Press, several newspaper-publishing corporations 
challenged the right of the U.S. Department of Labor to judicially 
enforce its investigatory subpoenas for corporate records.186 The
corporate petitioners contended that “enforcement would permit the
[government] to conduct general fishing expeditions into [their] books,
records, and papers” without probable cause.187 The Court rejected the
corporations’ argument that the probable cause standard applies to
administrative subpoenas and, in so doing, explained that corporations 
“are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private 
individuals have.”188 Instead, the Court held that, insofar as
administrative subpoenas for corporate records are concerned, the
Fourth Amendment “at the most guards against abuse only by way of 
too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be
‘particularly described,’ if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency
is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are 
184. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (explaining that “this Court has never limited the [Fourth] Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police”;
instead, “the Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed
upon ‘governmental action’—that is, ‘upon the activities of sovereign authority’” (quoting 
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921))). 
185. Jack W. Campbell IV, Note, Revoking the “Fishing License:” Recent Decisions Place
Unwarranted Restrictions on Administrative Agencies’ Power to Subpoena Personal Financial
Records, 49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 407 (1996) (reporting that “[c]ourts have asserted that subpoenas
for personal, as opposed to corporate, . . . records implicate greater privacy concerns” and that 
“[t]his distinction underlies heightened suspicion requirements for enforcement of administrative 
subpoenas seeking personal . . . records”).
 186. Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 189.
 187. Id. at 195.
 188. Id. at 205.
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808 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:775
relevant.”189 In reaching that result, the Court emphasized that the
challenged administrative subpoena sought corporate, as opposed to
private, papers.190 
Much the same can be said about the Court’s ruling in Morton Salt. 
There, the respondents—several corporate salt producers and a trade 
union—challenged the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) power to
require them to file reports indicating compliance with a federal court 
decree enforcing a cease and desist order.191 The Morton Salt Court 
upheld the FTC’s right to subpoena those compliance reports under 
the relaxed reasonable relevance standard192—and explained that 
corporations do not merit the same degree of Fourth Amendment 
protection as private persons: 
While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands 
made in the name of public investigation, corporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. They
are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact
upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as
artificial entities.193 
In other words, “the clear import of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt
is that the standard for judicial enforcement of administrative
subpoenas of a private citizen’s private papers is stricter than that for 
corporate papers.”194 
Skeptics might complain that since Oklahoma Press and Morton
Salt were decided the federal courts have abandoned any meaningful
distinction between corporate and private papers insofar as
189. Id. at 208.
 190. Id. at 204–05 (“[I]t has been settled that corporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and related matters.”).
191. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 634–35 (1950).
 192. See id. at 652–53 (noting that an administrative investigation is “sufficient” if it is “within
the authority of the agency, . . . not too indefinite[,] . . . reasonably relevant,” and not 
unreasonable (citing Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 208)). 
193. Id. at 652 (citations omitted).
194. Parks v. FDIC, 65 F.3d 207, 211 (1st Cir. 1995), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn
(Nov. 20, 1995); see also FDIC v. Wentz, 55 F.3d 905, 908 (3d Cir. 1995) (“When personal
documents of individuals, as contrasted with business records of corporations, are the subject of 
an administrative subpoena, privacy concerns must be considered.”); In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 
1137 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting than an administrative subpoena directed at individuals implicates
privacy rights); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (distinguishing 
between administrative subpoenas that seek corporate records and those that seek personal
papers). 
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administrative subpoenas are concerned.195 They have a point. As one
legal scholar has explained, “the minimal relevance standard once used 
primarily in connection with business subpoenas now authorizes access 
to vast amounts of personal information, to wit, any personal
information that is in record form” and “that regime seems to conflict 
with the Fourth Amendment’s injunction that searches and seizures of 
papers, as well as of houses, persons, and effects, are unreasonable 
unless authorized by a warrant based on probable cause.”196 
Yet, save for one fairly obscure and easily distinguishable 1964
case, Ryan v. United States,197 the Supreme Court has never held that 
the reasonable relevance standard applies to administratively 
subpoenaed private papers where the target of the investigation has a 
personal privacy interest in those documents.198 Moreover, the Court 
made it clear ten years after Ryan that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits even a grand jury subpoena from requiring a target to 
produce “private books and records that would incriminate him.”199 As
a result, to the extent that highly sensitive and revealing patient PDMP 
prescribing data are fairly characterized as private health-care 
records—that is, records in which the individual target has a personal
privacy interest—PDMP records are arguably distinct from corporate 
records for constitutional purposes and are entitled to heightened 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
2. PDMP Data Are Maintained by State Actors. The PDMP cases 
are further distinguishable from Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt
because PDMP data are collected by state actors subject to the Fourth 
Amendment and not by corporate entities. One of the primary
195. See Slobogin, supra note 183, at 817–20 (describing the erosion of “the sixty-year-old
distinction between corporate and personal records in connection with the subpoena process”).
 196. Id. at 826.
197. Ryan v. United States, 379 U.S. 61 (1964). In Ryan, the Supreme Court issued a terse
order holding that the IRS could subpoena the books of a private taxpayer under suspicion of tax 
fraud to ascertain his actual income without a showing of probable cause. Id. at 62. The Court
provided no rationale for its decision except “we sustain the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the reasons given in United States v. Powell.” Id. (citation omitted). Powell, however, was a
case that exclusively involved an IRS subpoena for corporate tax records. United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 49 (1964). One could also argue that Ryan is unique insofar as the target was under
a pre-subpoena legal obligation to provide the contents of the documents sought—his annual-
earnings information—to the very agency seeking those documents—the IRS.
 198. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“[T]his Court has never held 
that the Government may subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”).
199. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973).
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810 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:775
rationales for the application of a lenient standard of suspicion to
administrative subpoenas is that such subpoenas do not involve actual
searches and, therefore, merit no Fourth Amendment protection at all. 
For example, in Oklahoma Press, the Court contended that 
administrative subpoenas do not amount to “actual searches” because
“[n]o officer or other person has sought to enter petitioners’ premises 
against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, 
records or papers without their assent”;200 rather, at best, they 
constitute “constructive” searches conducted by the target of the
investigation themselves and not the government.201 
The DEA administrative subpoenas at issue in the PDMP cases,
however, do not fit comfortably into this “constructive” search 
framework.202 In the PDMP context, one government actor—the state 
legislature—legally compels drug dispensers to submit patient 
prescribing data to a state agency database while expressly limiting law
enforcement agency access to that database via a warrant requirement. 
A second government actor—the DEA—then demands that sensitive 
health-care information from the state PDMP without any 
individualized suspicion, warrant, or other judicial order in violation of 
the express limitations placed on its access to that information by the 
state legislature. It is, therefore, problematic to characterize DEA 
administrative subpoenas directed at state PDMPs as “constructive
searches” conducted by the target of the investigation themselves and not 
the government. Rather, the DEA subpoenas demand that a state 
agency, which itself is a government actor bound by the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct an actual search for private health records 
sought by law enforcement and often without notice to the target of
the investigation.203 
200. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 (1946).
 201. Id. at 202; Slobogin, supra note 183, at 827.
 202. Slobogin, supra note 183, at 827 (explaining that “several Supreme Court justices have
suggested that document subpoenas are not Fourth Amendment searches [because]: (1) They rely
on the recordholder, not the government, to produce the documents; (2) the target can challenge 
them before surrendering any items; and (3) they do not involve physical trespass or intrusion”).
 203. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL
3189868, at *7 (D. Utah July 27, 2017); see also Slobogin, supra note 183, at 827 (noting that one
of the rationales supporting the lenient reasonable relevance standard that applies to
administrative subpoenas is the target’s ability to “challenge them before surrendering any items”
and characterizing this rationale as specious given that “[t]he fact that it is the target (or a third
party) rather than the police who locates the documents obviously does not change the nature of
the revelations they contain, which can include information about medical treatment, finances, 
education, the identity of one’s communicants, and even the contents of one’s communications”);
id. (explaining further that “[t]he target’s ability to challenge a subpoena, while it may inhibit 
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Fourth Amendment case law draws a meaningful line between law 
enforcement’s demand that an investigatory target or a corporate third 
party conduct a search and law enforcement’s demand that another 
government agency do the same. For instance, in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,204 the policy at issue involved a collaboration between a 
“public hospital operated in the city of Charleston by the Medical 
University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) . . . concerned about an 
apparent increase in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving 
prenatal treatment”205 and the City of Charleston Police Department
(“CPD”), prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials.206 Pursuant
to that collaboration, the state hospital, MUSC, identified pregnant 
patients suspected of drug abuse and then surreptitiously tested those 
patients for cocaine use through a urine drug screen if they met certain 
criteria.207 When a patient tested positive for cocaine via the screen, 
MUSC then referred her either to substance-abuse treatment or to the
police for arrest and prosecution for illicit drug use—or both.208 
The Supreme Court described the question presented in Ferguson
broadly as “whether a state hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test 
to obtain evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement 
purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to 
the procedure”; and, “more narrowly,” as “whether the interest in 
using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from 
using cocaine can justify a departure from the general rule that an 
official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a 
valid warrant.”209 The Court ruled that “MUSC is a state hospital, [and] 
the members of its staff are government actors, subject to the strictures
of the Fourth Amendment” and, as such, “the urine tests conducted by 
those staff members were indisputably searches within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”210 It was, therefore, highly relevant in 
Ferguson that the initial search was conducted by a state actor bound 
some fishing expeditions, at most will only delay government access to the records, unless
something beyond the current relevance standard is applicable”).
204. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
 205. Id. at 70. 
206. See id. at 70–73 (describing the policy at issue).
 207. Id. at 71. 
208. Id. at 72. 
209. Id. at 69–70. 
210. Id. at 76. The Court recognized that “[n]either the District Court nor the Court of
Appeals concluded that any of the nine criteria used to identify the women to be searched
provided either probable cause to believe that they were using cocaine, or even the basis for a
reasonable suspicion of such use.” Id.
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by the Fourth Amendment and not an individual target or a 
corporation. 
Moreover, in holding that the MUSC–CPD policy violated the 
petitioners’ Fourth Amendment rights, the Court was careful to
distinguish the policy from its previous “special needs” cases, in which 
the Court had held that suspicionless drug tests conducted by certain
state actors—public employers and school officials—were
permissible.211 In doing so, the Court emphasized three points. First, 
the “special needs” or “administrative search” exception to the warrant 
requirement is expressly confined to a “search policy designed to serve
non-law-enforcement ends”212 whereas the “central and indispensable
feature of the [MUSC–CPD] policy from its inception was the use of 
law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse 
treatment.”213 Second, “[i]n the previous four [special-needs] cases,
there was no misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the 
potential use of the test results, and there were protections against the
dissemination of the results to third parties” generally, and law 
enforcement specifically.214 Finally, “[t]he reasonable expectation of 
privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a 
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her consent”215 and “an intrusion on 
that expectation [of privacy] may have adverse consequences because 
it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care.”216 
The obvious parallels between Ferguson and the PDMP cases 
make it easy to understand why the DEA failed to invoke the special-
needs doctrine in support of its warrantless searches in the Utah and 
Oregon litigation. There, both cases involved a state actor’s disclosure 
of patient prescribing data to law enforcement without patient consent.
Recognizing this important distinction, the DEA attempted to
distinguish Ferguson on the sole basis that, in that case, law 
enforcement relied on a collaborative policy and not on the service of 
administrative subpoenas to collect private health information from 
211. Id. at 77–80. 
212. Id. at 74. 
213. Id. at 80. 
214. Id. at 78. 
215. Id.
 216. Id. at 78 n.14.
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another state actor.217 The Oregon district court, which relied on
Ferguson in ruling in favor of the intervenors,218 refused to even 
address that argument.219 The Utah district court, on the other hand, 
did distinguish Ferguson at least in part on that basis, explaining that 
“[a]lthough Ferguson involved information passed from one 
government entity to another, it did not involve an administrative 
subpoena.”220 
The Utah district court’s disposal of Ferguson on such grounds is 
specious for several reasons. First, the pertinent legal distinction 
between law enforcement’s extraction of private prescribing
information from another government agency under the special-needs 
exception and the same conduct pursuant to an administrative
subpoena is that a special-needs target is actually better off than a 
subpoena target. As Ferguson and the PDMP cases illustrate, 
investigatory targets can challenge either of those warrantless searches 
in federal district court. The Fourth Amendment protections provided 
to targets of warrantless searches under the special-needs doctrine’s 
balancing test, however, well exceed the minimal relevance standard
that applies to targets of warrantless administrative subpoenas.221 
Second, the PDMP patients and prescribers arguably have a 
higher—and even more reasonable—expectation of privacy in their 
prescribing data than did the patients in Ferguson. This is because the 
Ferguson patients were not provided any guarantees by the hospital— 
or any other state actor—that the results of their drug tests would not 
be shared with law enforcement. Instead, the Ferguson patients’ 
privacy interests emanated from an assumption: that any patient
reasonably expects that hospitals will not share their diagnostic testing 
results with nonmedical personnel without their consent.222 The Utah
217. Reply in Support of Petition to Enforce DEA Administrative Subpoenas at 25 n.13, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868 (D. Utah Nov.
23, 2016).
 218. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 998 F. Supp.
2d 957, 965–66 (D. Or. 2014) (referencing Ferguson in its discussion determining that the
intervenors’ expectation of privacy was reasonable), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017).
 219. Id.
 220. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, 2017 WL 3189868, at *6. 
221. See, e.g., Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (espousing that, in the special-needs cases, the Court 
“employed a balancing test that weighed the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy
against the ‘special needs’ that supported the program” and not the reasonable relevance test).
 222. See id. (“The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient
undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her consent.”).
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814 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:775
patients’ reasonable expectation that their PDMP health data would 
not be subject to a warrantless search by law enforcement, on the other 
hand, is based on the fact that the Utah legislature expressly enacted a 
statute that requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant to access 
PDMP data.223 
B. Pre-Carpenter Third-Party Doctrine 
The DEA also argued in the Oregon and Utah cases that it was 
entitled to PDMP prescribing data without a warrant under the third-
party doctrine.224 The third-party doctrine is implicated whenever an
individual voluntarily shares information with a third party that later 
submits that information to the government. As the Supreme Court 
has held, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” and, thus, no
cause to seek shelter in the Fourth Amendment to protect any 
information held by a third party from government search or seizure.225 
This is because a person who voluntarily turns over information to
third parties “assume[s] the risk” that the third party will disclose that
information to the government.226 As Professor Monu Bedi recently 
explained, 
[t]he early cases applying the third party doctrine centered on face-
to-face conversations with government informants. Under these
decisions, as long as agents did not trespass on a person’s property,
individuals did not have Fourth Amendment protection in what they
disclosed to an undercover informant, irrespective of the individual’s
belief that the informant would not disclose the information to the
government. . . . As the Court articulated, “a wrongdoer’s misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntary confides his wrongdoing 
will not reveal it” receives no protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.227 
The Supreme Court expanded the third-party doctrine to
encompass documents over the course of three 1970s-era decisions: 
223. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37f-301 (2018).
224. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 967; DEA Administrative
Subpoenas at 18–22, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611-DN-DBP
(D. Utah Nov. 23, 2016).
225. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
 226. Id. at 744.
 227. Monu Bedi, The Fourth Amendment Disclosure Doctrines, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 461, 463 (2017) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).













   
   
   
 





     





   
      
    
      
   
   
 8152020] PRESCRIPTION-DRUG POLICING
228 229Couch v. United States, United States v. Miller,  and Smith v.
Maryland.230 Any discussion of the third-party doctrine—and its 
applicability to PDMP prescribing data—must begin with Miller and 
Smith.231 Moreover, and as explained below, while the Court’s 
decisions in United States v. Jones232 and Riley v. California233 are
instructive, they did not alter the Miller–Smith regime. 
1. United States v. Miller.  In Miller, the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury presented grand jury subpoenas to two banks requesting 
Miller’s account records.234 The banks complied with those subpoenas 
and produced Miller’s checks, deposit slips, financial statements, and 
monthly statements to the government.235 The district court denied 
Miller’s motion to suppress those records, but the court of appeals 
reversed, holding “that the [g]overnment had improperly 
circumvented . . . [Miller’s] Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” by obtaining his bank records 
without a warrant.236 The government appealed that decision, arguing
that Miller had no Fourth Amendment interest in the records. The
Supreme Court agreed pursuant to the third-party doctrine.237 
Miller is often quoted238 for its statement that the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant clause “does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
228. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
229. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
230. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
 231. Couch held that a defendant taxpayer could not invoke either the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments to protect tax documents that he had knowingly and voluntarily provided to his
accountant and that his accountant provided to the government. Couch, 409 U.S. at 335–36. 
Because it is well settled that taxpayers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their tax-
related documents and there was no dispute that Couch knowingly and voluntarily provided his
tax documents to his accountant, id., Couch is inapposite to the PDMP-data cases and warrants
no additional discussion.
232. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
233. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
 234. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437. 
235. Id. at 438.
 236. Id. at 438–39. 
237. Id. at 439, 444. 
238. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 744 (1979); United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2019); Palmieri v. United States,
896 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Presley v. United States, 895 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018); 
United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1019 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803,
806 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2014); Kerns v. Bader, 
663 F.3d 1173, 1184 (10th Cir. 2011).
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[g]overnment authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”239 The 
breadth and scope of that contention is sweeping. It is important to 
point out, however, that Miller acknowledged the Court’s obligation to
“examine the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected
in order to determine whether there is a legitimate ‘expectation of 
privacy’ concerning their contents” in deciding the Fourth Amendment 
claim presented—and it did just that.240 Specifically, the Court held that 
Miller had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his checks and 
deposit slips because “checks are not confidential communications but 
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”241 The
Court also emphasized the voluntariness of Miller’s banking 
transactions, pointing out that “all of the documents obtained . . .
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks.”242 
2. Smith v. Maryland.  Three years after Miller, the Court decided 
Smith.243 That case involved a telephone company’s installation of a
pen register at its central offices at the police’s request in order to 
record the numbers Smith dialed from his home phone.244 The Court 
applied the Katz test to Smith’s Fourth Amendment challenge and held
that it failed both prongs.245 First, the Court ruled that “people in 
general [do not] entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial” from their home phones.246 Second, it concluded
that “even if [Smith] did harbor some subjective expectation that the 
phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not 
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”247 because “a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”248 
239. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
240. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
 241. Id.
 242. Id. (emphasis added). 
243. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735. 
244. Id. at 737.
 245. See id. at 739–46 (conducting its Fourth Amendment analysis based on Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
246. Id. at 742.
 247. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). 
248. Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)). 
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The Court reasoned that when Smith used his home phone, he 
“voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone 
company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the 
ordinary course of business.”249 As a result, he “assumed the risk that 
the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”250 and 
abandoned any Fourth Amendment protection in the numbers he
voluntarily conveyed to the phone company.  
3. The Fourth Amendment Supervillain, Jones, and Riley. “The
third-party doctrine has been subject to tsunamis of criticism”251 as a 
result of its alleged failure to put any “constitutional limits on dragnet
data collection.”252 Professor Orin Kerr proffered that “[t]he third-
party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. It is
the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely criticized as profoundly 
misguided.”253 Professor Jane Bambauer opined that “[t]he third-party 
doctrine has become the Fourth Amendment’s supervillain”254 and 
Professor Daniel Solove characterized the doctrine as “one of the most 
serious threats to privacy in the digital age.”255 In sum, “[t]here are few 
areas of constitutional law that raise scholars’ ire and trouble jurists 
like the Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine.”256 
The Supreme Court is well aware of these critiques. In fact, in
United States v. Jones,257 five Justices openly discussed the third-party 
249. Id. at 744.
 250. Id.
251. United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 24,
2016); see also Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 214–15 (2006) (arguing that
Fourth Amendment protections cannot vanish due to advances in technology that allow the
government to obtain information from third parties without a warrant); Stephen E. Henderson,
Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and
the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007) (noting criticism of the third-party 
doctrine).
 252. Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 261 (2015).
 253. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009). 
254. Bambauer, supra note 252, at 261.
 255. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call
for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005). 
256. Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73, 73
(2018). 
257. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). The third-party doctrine was inapposite to
the Court’s holding in Jones, which was that the police’s “attachment of a Global-Positioning-
System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to
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doctrine’s inability to resolve modern-day surveillance and data-
aggregation cases given the frequency with which personal data is 
transmitted electronically, stored by third-party intermediaries, and,
therefore, not obtained by a physical invasion or trespass.258 In her
Jones concurrence, Justice Sotomayor urged “reconsider[ation of] the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”259 She added that 
the doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks,” including the disclosure of
“medications they purchase to online retailers.”260 Justice Sotomayor 
also cautioned that “by making available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom
the government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” digital
surveillance techniques, like GPS monitoring, “may ‘alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical 
to democratic society.’”261 
The Supreme Court further evidenced its interest in limiting the 
extension of certain analog-era Fourth Amendment doctrines to 
electronically stored information in Riley v. California.262 Riley
involved a police search of a suspect’s cell phone incident to his 
arrest.263 As the Court colorfully explained, Riley “require[d it] to 
decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell
phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”264 
The Riley Court unanimously held that police are required to
secure a warrant in order to conduct a search of an individual’s cell
phone incident to arrest.265 In reaching that result, Chief Justice
Roberts observed that, while the “categorical” search incident to arrest
monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets” constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Id.
at 402. 
258. Id. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
 259. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
 260. Id. (emphasis added). 
261. Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Flaum, J., concurring)). 
262. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
 263. Id. at 378–80. 
264. Id. at 385.
 265. Id. at 403.
OLIVA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2019 3:50 PM        
  
 











    
  
  
   
  
    
  
 
        
 
   
 8192020] PRESCRIPTION-DRUG POLICING
rule established in United States v. Robinson266 “strikes the appropriate 
balance [between an individual’s privacy and the promotion of 
legitimate government interests] in the context of physical objects, 
neither of its rationales [e.g., harm to officers and destruction of 
evidence] has much force with respect to digital content on cell
phones.”267 He further declared that “[c]ell phones differ in both a
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be 
kept on an arrestee’s person,” largely due to their capacity to store vast 
quantities of personal information268 and “pervasiveness.”269 
The Riley Court found the government’s argument that cell-
phone-data searches are materially indistinguishable from searches of 
physical items patently absurd, responding: “[t]hat is like saying a ride
on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. 
Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies 
lumping them together.”270 The importance of Riley is that it represents 
the Court’s willingness to depart from the mechanical application of 
analog-era Fourth Amendment doctrines to the search of mass storage,
digital devices which, as the Court recognized, “hold for many
Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”271 
This Fourth Amendment digital doctrinal renaissance had little 
material impact on the third-party doctrine prior to Carpenter.272 Miller 
and Smith, therefore, remained binding precedent. As a result, law
enforcement agencies, including the DEA, relied heavily on their 
holdings to conduct sweeping, warrantless investigations of personal 
data held by third parties, including suspicionless searches of sensitive 
health information contained in state PDMP electronic databases.273 
266. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
 267. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.
 268. Id. at 393.
 269. Id. at 395.
 270. Id. at 393.
 271. Id. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
 272. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 38–39 (1988) (upholding a warrantless
search of defendants’ trash).
273. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868, at
*5 (D. Utah July 27, 2017); Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (D. Or. 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017).
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C. Application of Pre-Carpenter Third-Party-Doctrine Precedent to 
the PDMP Cases 
Nonetheless, even pre-Carpenter precedents such as Miller and
Smith do not sanction a DEA warrantless search of PDMP prescribing 
data. A close reading of those cases indicates that the third-party
doctrine is subject to two important limiting principles. First, neither
case asserts a categorical rule excluding all information transmitted to 
a third party from Fourth Amendment protection. Instead, Miller and 
Smith require courts to evaluate the nature of the documents held by a
third party to ascertain whether an individual target has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information sought by law enforcement. 
Second, the third-party doctrine’s application is limited to information
voluntarily or consensually disclosed to another. Consequently, where 
dispensers are legally compelled to disclose prescribing data to a 
government agency—as was the case in the Oregon and Utah PDMP 
litigation—extension of the third-party doctrine to that information is 
unwarranted. 
1. Oregon PDMP Litigation. The district court’s rejection of the 
DEA’s request to enforce its subpoenas in the Oregon PDMP litigation 
was predicated on the third-party doctrine’s limitations. The court 
recognized that the case before it was “markedly different from Miller
and Smith for two reasons.”274 First, the PDMP records at issue were
“more inherently personal or private than [the] bank records” at issue
in Miller.275 Second, “patients and doctors are not voluntarily 
conveying information to the PDMP.”276 Instead “[t]he submission of 
prescription information to the PDMP is required by law. The only way
to avoid submission of prescription information to the PDMP is to 
forgo medical treatment or to leave the state, [sic] This is not a 
meaningful choice.”277 
Forgoing necessary medical treatment under any circumstances is 
detrimental. But choosing to do so in order to avoid warrantless law 
enforcement searches seems particularly problematic—legally and 
practically. The Supreme Court has recognized as much and said that 
“an intrusion on [a patient’s reasonable] expectation [of privacy in 
274. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
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their health-care data] may have adverse [public health] consequences 
because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care.”278 
2. Utah PDMP Litigation. Unlike the Oregon district court, the 
Utah court enforced the DEA administrative subpoena based on a
categorical reading of the third-party doctrine. It conceded that 
“[m]edical records, including prescriptions, are no doubt personal and
private matters.”279 It went on to conclude, however, that “[t]he
expectation of privacy analysis nonetheless weighs in the DEA’s 
favor”280 for at least two reasons. First, the court invoked the third-
party doctrine without meaningfully acknowledging that dispensers are 
legally compelled to transmit prescribing data to PDMPs.281 It found 
that, when patients convey confidential information to their doctors for 
the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis, they assume the risk
that their doctors will turn that information over to the PDMP, as 
doctors are required to do by statute.282 Patients, then, presumably also 
assume the risk that the state PDMP will turn over their sensitive
prescribing data to law enforcement without a warrant in violation of
state law.283 Specifically, the court explained that “[a] patient in Utah 
decides to trust a prescribing physician with health information to
facilitate a diagnosis” and, “[i]n so doing, a patient takes the risk . . . 
that his or her information will be conveyed to the government as 
required by the [PDMP statute].”284 
This reasoning misses the point. It seems incredible to argue that
Utah patients assumed any risk that their protected, private health
information, which was required to be turned over to the state PDMP
by their dispenser, would then be turned over to law enforcement by
the PDMP pursuant to an administrative subpoena. The more
plausible contention is that Utah patients reasonably assumed, in 
reliance on state law, that the PDMP would make no such conveyance
to law enforcement without a warrant supported by probable cause.  
Fortunately, the Supreme Court recently provided additional 
guidance regarding the application of the third-party doctrine to 
278. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78–79 n.14 (2001).
279. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868, at
*8 (D. Utah July 27, 2017).
 280. Id.
 281. See id.
 282. Id.
 283. See id.
 284. Id.
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personal information obtained by law enforcement from a third-party
electronic database without a warrant. We turn now to that decision. 
IV. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
On June 22, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its highly 
anticipated decision in Carpenter v. United States, which held that law
enforcement agencies must obtain a warrant to access an investigatory 
target’s cell-site-location information (“CSLI”) from a third-party
cellular phone company.285 Chief Justice Roberts authored the
majority opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan. The remaining four members of the court—Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch—each filed separate, dissenting opinions.
The pertinent factual, technical, and substantive aspects of the case are 
discussed below. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
In April 2011, police officers arrested four suspects for a string of 
armed robberies of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in Michigan and
Ohio.286 One of the arrestees confessed to police that the group was 
responsible for the robberies and that as many as fifteen additional 
accomplices had participated in the crimes as getaway drivers and
lookouts.287 The informant supplied the FBI with his personal cell 
phone number and the cell phone numbers of several other suspects.288 
The FBI used the confessant’s call logs to identify additional phone 
numbers that he had dialed around the time of the robberies.289 One of 
these numbers belonged to Timothy Carpenter. Upon receipt of
Carpenter’s cell phone number, the FBI submitted applications for 
Stored Communications Act § 2703(d) orders directed at Carpenter’s
wireless carriers—MetroPCS and Sprint.290 Those orders sought 
Carpenter’s historic CSLI over a 152-day period during which the 
string of robberies occurred.291 
CSLI records enable law enforcement to reconstruct in detail
where an individual has traveled throughout the time period covered 
285. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
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by the data. This is because “[c]ell phones perform their wide and
growing variety of functions by connecting to a set of radio antennas 
called ‘cell sites.’”292 “Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it 
generates a time-stamped record known as [CSLI],” which “[w]ireless 
carriers collect and store . . . for their own business purposes.”293 
The precision of [CSLI] information depends on the size of the 
geographic area covered by the cell site. The greater the 
concentration of cell sites, the smaller the coverage area. As data
usage from cell phones has increased, wireless carriers have installed 
more cell sites to handle the traffic. That has led to increasingly
compact coverage areas, especially in urban areas.294 
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) creates privacy
protections for CSLI and the content of stored wire and electronic 
communications.295 Under § 2703(d) of the SCA, law enforcement can 
compel the production of CSLI when “specific and articulable facts 
show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the 
records . . . sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”296 The “relevant and material” standard of suspicion 
that applies to § 2703(d) orders is similar to but more demanding than
the “relevant or material” test that applies to CSA § 876 administrative 
subpoenas.297 Both standards, of course, are far more lenient than the 
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement.  
Unlike the CSA, however, the SCA requires law enforcement to 
obtain a court order before searching the content of a target’s electronic 
communications and related information.298 In addition—and, again, 
unlike the CSA—the SCA requires the government to obtain a warrant 
before it can access the content of a customer’s or subscriber’s 
electronic communications, unless the government provides the 
customer or subscriber prior notice.299 However, the SCA does not 
require such prior notice to obtain a customer’s or subscriber’s CSLI.300 
292. Id. at 2211. 
293. Id. at 2211–12. 
294. Id.
295. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat.
1848, 1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2018)).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
297. 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (2018).
 298. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), with 21 U.S.C. § 876(a). 
299. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(A).
 300. Id. § 2703(c)(3). 
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Two federal magistrate judges determined that the FBI had met 
the relevant and material standard of suspicion required by § 2703(d) 
to obtain Timothy Carpenter’s historic CSLI records and issued orders
requiring Carpenter’s wireless carriers to submit that data spanning the 
152-day period requested by the FBI.301 MetroPCS and Sprint 
complied with those orders and collectively provided the FBI with
CSLI spanning more than four months, which included “12,898 
location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101
data points per day.”302 According to the government, Carpenter’s 
CSLI data placed his phone near several of the robberies.303 
Consequently, the FBI charged Carpenter with six counts of robbery 
and six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of
violence.304 
Carpenter’s motion to suppress his CSLI data was denied by the 
district court.305 He subsequently went to trial, was convicted by a jury 
on all but one of the charged counts, and was sentenced to over one
hundred years in federal prison.306 Carpenter appealed the district 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit.307 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to suppress 
Carpenter’s CSLI data, ruling “that the government’s collection of 
business records containing cell-site data was not a [Fourth
Amendment] search” under the third-party doctrine.308 It did,
however, explain the type of information that is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement notwithstanding third-party
disclosure. Relying on Smith,309 the Sixth Circuit explained that “the 
federal courts have long recognized a core distinction [regarding
personal communications]: although the content of personal 
communications is private, the information necessary to get those 
communications from point A to point B is not.”310 The court then
301. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
 302. Id.
 303. Id. at 2212–13.
 304. Id. at 2212. 
305. Id.
 306. Id. at 2212–13. 
307. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
 308. Id. at 890.
 309. Id. at 889 (“[T]he question presented here . . . is answered by [Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979)].”).
 310. Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
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applied that distinction to Carpenter’s CSLI records and found that 
they “fall on the unprotected side of the line” because “the cell-site 
data—like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses—are
information that facilitate personal communications, rather than part 
of the content of those communications themselves.”311 The Supreme
Court granted Carpenter’s petition for certiorari. 
B. Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion in Carpenter, 
which held that “the [g]overnment conducts a search under the Fourth
Amendment when it accesses [seven days of] historical cell phone 
records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past 
movements.”312 He began with a brief exposition of Fourth 
Amendment fundamentals, pointing out that the Amendment’s “basic 
purpose . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”313 Borrowing
substantially from the Court’s opinion in Riley, he explained that the 
Framers drafted the Amendment “as a ‘response to the reviled
“general warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era, which 
allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained
search for evidence of criminal activity.’”314 
Chief Justice Roberts next invoked Katz, explaining that “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”315 He went on to note 
that “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and
his expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable,’ . . . official intrusion into that private sphere generally 
qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable 
cause.”316 The Chief Justice also emphasized that one of the “basic 
guideposts”317 of the Fourth Amendment is “to place obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”318 Pointing to Kyllo v. 
United States319 and Riley as examples, he further reflected on the
311. Id. at 887.
312. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2211, 2211, 2217 n.3 (2018).
 313. Id. at 2213 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). 
314. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
 315. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
 316. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
 317. Id. at 2214. 
318. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
319. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). At issue in Kyllo was law enforcement’s use
of a thermal-imaging device to scan the defendant’s home without a warrant “to determine 
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Court’s evolving application of a less mechanical and more nuanced 
application of pre-digital Fourth Amendment doctrines in the face of 
technological innovation and the government’s enhanced surveillance 
capabilities.320 
Chief Justice Roberts then explained that the “personal location 
information maintained by a third party . . . lie[s] at the intersection of
two lines of [Fourth Amendment] cases.”321 The first set of those cases,
United States v. Knotts322 and Jones, establish the boundaries of an 
individual’s privacy interest in his physical location and movements.323 
The Chief Justice distinguished Knotts, which held that police were not 
required to obtain a warrant to track a beeper they had placed in a 
suspect’s car, from Jones, which held that the police’s warrantless 
placement of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car and subsequent 
twenty-eight-day surveillance of that vehicle’s movements ran afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment.324 In the majority’s view, the important
differences between Knotts and Jones revolve around the varying levels 
of sophistication and pervasiveness of the law enforcement 
surveillance systems at issue in each case. While Knotts involved 
“rudimentary tracking facilitated by the beeper . . . during a discrete
‘automotive journey,’”325 Jones encompassed “sophisticated
surveillance,” which tracked the target’s “every movement” over an 
approximately four-week-long time period.326 
The Court then shifted to the second line of cases implicated by
the FBI’s warrantless collection of Carpenter’s CSLI: Miller, Smith, 
and the third-party doctrine.327 As the Court saw it, “[t]here is a world
of difference between the limited types of personal information
whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner’s home . . . consistent with the use of
[high-intensity] lamps” typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Id. at 29. After acknowledging
that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” the Court analyzed the 
issue presented under the two-part Katz test. Id. at 33–35. The Court subsequently concluded that
“[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 40. 
320. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
 321. Id.
322. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
 323. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215.
 324. Id.
 325. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285).
 326. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
 327. Id. at 2216. 
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addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location 
information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”328 The Chief
Justice went on to say that 
[g]iven the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that
the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome
the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the 
Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or 
leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record
of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The location
information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the 
product of a search.329 
Perhaps most notably, the Chief Justice invoked both of the third-
party doctrine’s limiting principles discussed above while
distinguishing Miller and Smith. First, he rejected the government’s 
argument that the third-party doctrine operates categorically and
without constraint to eviscerate any Fourth Amendment protection for 
records maintained by a commercial entity, insisting that Miller and 
Smith “did not rely solely on the act of sharing.”330 Instead, those cases 
require courts to consider “‘the nature of the particular documents 
sought’ to determine whether ‘there is a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” concerning their contents.’”331 The Court then held that
historic CSLI was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because
such information constitutes “a detailed chronicle of a person’s 
physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several
years” and, thus, “implicates privacy concerns far beyond those 
considered in Smith and Miller.”332 
Second, the Court rejected the contention that Carpenter 
voluntarily disclosed his CSLI to his wireless carriers.333 It observed 
that CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term”
for two reasons334: (1) because cell phones are “indispensable to
participation in modern society,” carrying one may not actually be a 
328. Id. at 2219. 
329. Id. at 2217. 
330. Id. at 2219. 
331. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
 332. Id. at 2220. 
333. Id. at 2219. 
334. Id.
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completely voluntary choice;335 and (2) cell phones are constantly in
connection with cell sites and, thereby, generate CSLI “without any 
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”336 
Consequently, Carpenter had not “voluntarily ‘assume[d] the risk’ of 
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”337 
The Court also held that individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in CSLI.338 Relying on the Jones concurrences, Chief Justice
Roberts announced that society can reasonably expect law 
enforcement to refrain from monitoring and cataloguing an 
individual’s every movement.339 Analogizing CSLI surveillance to the 
GPS monitoring at issue in Jones, he further observed that “the time-
stamped [CSLI] data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”340 
This is because “[a] cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond 
public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, 
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”341 
Finally, the Court expressed concern that “the retrospective quality of 
the [CSLI] gives police access to a category of information otherwise
unknowable” and the only limit on the government’s ability to gather 
CSLI is the length of time the wireless carriers retain the data, “which 
currently [is] for up to five years.”342 
The Chief Justice concluded Carpenter by characterizing it as a
“narrow” decision so as not to “embarrass the future.”343 He
emphasized that Miller and Smith were still good law insofar as they 
apply to “conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as 
security cameras.”344 The Court also explained that the case did not 





 338. Id. at 2217. 
339. Id.
 340. Id. (quotations omitted)
 341. Id. at 2218 (emphasis added). 
342. Id.
 343. Id. at 2220 (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). 
344. Id.
 345. Id.
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C. Justice Kennedy’s Dissent 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent appears primarily motivated by his 
disagreement with the majority’s interpretation and application of the
third-party doctrine. In his view, Carpenter’s CSLI records differed 
immaterially from the business records at issue in Miller and Smith.346 
Therefore, he concluded that the government’s collection of CSLI 
records from Carpenter’s wireless carriers did not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.347 Deploying similar reasoning, he also
contended that Carpenter could not have any reasonable expectation
of privacy in his CSLI data because he neither owned nor controlled 
those records.348 
D. Justice Alito’s Dissent 
Justice Alito’s dissent advanced two distinct grievances with the 
majority opinion. First, he complained that “the Court ignores the 
basic distinction between an actual search (dispatching law 
enforcement officers to enter private premises and root through 
private papers and effects) and an order merely requiring a party to
look through its own records and produce specified documents.”349 He
further argued that “[t]he order in this case was the functional
equivalent of a subpoena for documents, and there is no evidence that 
these writs were regarded as ‘searches’ at the time of the founding.”350 
In support of that proposition, Justice Alito expounded on the 
advent and deployment of subpoenas duces tecum and other forms of 
compulsory process under the common law from the reign of King
Richard II until the founding of the United States.351 He also provided 
a short history on the Court’s evolution from Boyd v. United States,352 
which “held the compulsory production of documents to the same 
standard as actual searches and seizures,”353 to Oklahoma Press,354 
which applied the considerably more lenient reasonable relevance test 
346. Id. at 2232–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
347. Id. at 2230.
 348. Id. at 2229. 
349. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
350. Id.
 351. Id. at 2247–50. 
352. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
 353. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2253 (Alito, J., dissenting).
354. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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to subpoenas for corporate books and records.355 According to Justice
Alito, the common law history and applicable Court precedent make
one thing clear: the compulsory production of documents pursuant to
a subpoena is not a Fourth Amendment search subject to the warrant 
requirement because such production does not entail any physical 
intrusion or trespass.356 At best, it is a “constructive search” subject 
only to the reasonable relevance standard of suspicion.357 
Chief Justice Roberts responded to Justice Alito’s subpoena-
related arguments in the majority opinion. At the outset, he explained 
that “this Court has never held that the [g]overnment may subpoena 
third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy” and that “[a]lmost all of the examples Justice
Alito cites . . . contemplated requests for evidence implicating 
diminished privacy interests or for a corporation’s own books.”358 Chief 
Justice Roberts further contended that “[i]f the choice to proceed by
subpoena provided a categorical limitation on Fourth Amendment 
protection, [as purported by Justice Alito], no type of record would ever 
be protected by the warrant requirement.”359 This is because, “[u]nder 
Justice Alito’s view, private letters, digital contents of a cell phone— 
any personal information reduced to document form, in fact—may be
collected by subpoena for no reason other than ‘official curiosity.’”360 
Justice Alito’s second grievance involved the Court’s treatment of 
the third-party doctrine, which he maintained “destabilizes long-
established Fourth Amendment doctrine.”361 His point was 
straightforward: Carpenter had no ownership interest in the CSLI
records, which were the wireless carriers’ property, and, consequently,
he had no right to raise any Fourth Amendment objection regarding
those records under Miller and Smith.362 Justice Alito characterized the 
majority’s decision, which permitted Carpenter to object to the search
of third-party property, as “revolutionary” and inconsistent with “the 
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment and more than a
century of Supreme Court precedent.”363 
355. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2252–54 (Alito, J., dissenting).
 356. Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
357. Id.
 358. Id. at 2221 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
 359. Id. at 2222 (emphasis added). 
360. Id.
 361. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
362. Id. at 2257–61. 
363. Id. at 2247. 
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Chief Justice Roberts also pushed back on Justice Alito’s 
arguments that centered around textualism and precedent. The Chief 
Justice explained that the CSLI data at issue in the case, which tracked 
Carpenter’s every movement over an extensive period of time, 
implicated the Fourth Amendment’s concern with arbitrary 
government power in a way that the phone numbers and bank records 
under review in Miller and Smith did not.364 Moreover, Chief Justice
Roberts countered Justice Alito’s reliance on Miller and Smith by 
pointing to the Court’s decision in Riley, in which Justice Alito 
concurred, explaining that “[w]hen confronting new concerns wrought 
by digital technology, this Court has been careful not to uncritically 
extend existing precedents.”365 
E. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas’s dissent castigated the majority’s reliance on the
Katz privacy test,366 which he argued should be overruled.367 He
characterized the Katz test as, among other things, “foreign to the
ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment,”368 “unworkable in practice,”369 
and “a failed experiment.”370 Justice Thomas’s fervent advocacy for 
Katz’s demise stems from two propositions. First, “[t]he Katz test has 
no basis in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment.”371 Second,
“it invites courts to make judgments about policy, not law.”372 
F. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissent 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is perhaps the most intriguing, in part 
because it reads more like a concurrence.373 The thrust of his opinion is 
a discussion of three potential ways to deal with the problem that is the
third-party doctrine: 
364. Id. at 2222 (majority opinion). 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
367. Id. at 2246 (contending that the Court “is dutybound to reconsider” Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
368. Id. at 2243.
 369. Id. at 2244.
 370. Id. at 2246.
 371. Id. at 2236.
 372. Id.
373. Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the Third
Party Doctrine, TEACHPRIVACY (July 1, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-united-
states-cell-phone-location-records-and-the-third-party-doctrine [https://perma.cc/8GJC-5HKL]
(explaining that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent “should probably be a concurring opinion”).
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The first is to ignore the problem, maintain Smith and Miller, and live
with the consequences. If the confluence of these decisions and
modern technology means our Fourth Amendment rights are reduced
to nearly nothing, so be it. The second choice is to 
set Smith and Miller aside and try again using the Katz “reasonable
expectation of privacy” jurisprudence that produced them. The third 
is to look for answers elsewhere.374 
As Justice Gorsuch evaluated each of these options, he went to
great lengths to repudiate both the third-party doctrine and Katz. In 
his view, Smith and Miller amount to little more than a “doubtful 
application of Katz that lets the government search almost whatever it
wants whenever it wants.”375 As he explained,
[t]oday we use the Internet to do most everything. Smartphones make
it easy to keep a calendar, correspond with friends, make calls, 
conduct banking, and even watch the game. Countless Internet
companies maintain records about us and, increasingly, for us. Even 
our most private documents—those that, in other eras, we would have
locked safely in a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside on third 
party servers. Smith and Miller teach that the police can review all of 
this material, on the theory that no one reasonably expects any of it
will be kept private. But no one believes that, if they ever did.376 
Justice Gorsuch concluded his dissent by proposing that the Court 
jettison the third-party doctrine and resolve cases involving the 
compulsory production of third-party papers by “look[ing] to a more
traditional Fourth Amendment approach” grounded in the positive 
rights that attend to property.377 Applying that approach, he contended
that it is “entirely possible a person’s cell-site data could qualify as his
papers or effects under existing law” given the positive legal rights in
such data provided to customers and subscribers under the SCA.378 He
also hinted that he may have ruled in Carpenter’s favor on that basis 
had Carpenter not waived his right to invoke positive property rights 
in his CSLI, which was “his most promising line of argument.”379 
374. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
375. Id. at 2264. 
376. Id. at 2262. 
377. Id. at 2272. 
378. Id.
 379. Id.
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V. CARPENTER’S APPLICATION TO STATE PDMP HEALTH 
INFORMATION
The Carpenter decision has been heralded as a “major statement 
on privacy in the digital age”380 and a “landmark privacy case.”381 As 
explained above, Carpenter held that individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their physical locations and movements. The 
key question in analyzing the cases involving PDMP subpoenas is 
whether patients have a similar expectation of privacy in records that 
contain their sensitive health information. The remainder of this 
Article discusses the applicability of Carpenter to prescribing records 
stored in state PDMPs. 
Carpenter analyzed the petitioner’s privacy rights in his CSLI data 
held by a third party by looking at the “intersection of two lines of 
cases”382: (1) decisions on expectations of privacy in physical location
and movements;383 and (2) precedent on the third-party doctrine.384 The
DEA’s acquisition of patient prescribing records from state PDMPs,
however, implicates a person’s expectation of privacy in her health-
care information and not in her locations and movements. As a result, 
this Article first discusses an individual’s right to privacy in her 
prescribing records and then examines the post-Carpenter third-party 
doctrine. 
A. The Right to Health-Information Privacy 
Carpenter held that individuals have an expectation of privacy in 
their physical locations. The question for PDMP data is whether they 
have a similar expectation of privacy in their prescribing records. While 
there is no on-point Fourth Amendment precedent that controls the
PDMP-data cases, courts have long recognized that individuals have
380. Adam Liptak, In Ruling on Cellphone Location Data, Supreme Court Makes Statement
on Digital Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/ 
us/politics/supreme-court-warrants-cell-phone-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/9UZ6-53RZ].
381. Alexia Ramirez & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Supreme Court Strengthens Digital
Privacy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 22, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
blog/supreme-court-strengthens-digital-privacy [https://perma.cc/E4TS-6NGX]. But see Amy
Davidson Sorkin, In Carpenter, the Supreme Court Rules, Narrowly, for Privacy, NEW YORKER
(June 22, 2018) https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/in-carpenter-the-supreme-
court-rules-narrowly-for-privacy [https://perma.cc/A5LF-ZPX7] (“Carpenter is not quite a full
manifesto for digital privacy, but it insists that there is a new discussion to be had, and it tries to
set the terms.”). 
382. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214–15. 
383. Id. at 2215. 
384. Id. at 2216. 
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significant Fourteenth Amendment constitutional privacy interests in
their medical records. And courts and commentators have repeatedly
recognized that Fourteenth Amendment privacy interests may 
influence or inform individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy in
the Fourth Amendment context.385 This Section provides a detailed 
summary of the courts’ consistent treatment of health-care data as 
exceptionally private, beginning with applicable Fourteenth 
Amendment precedent. It then describes the Supreme Court’s relevant
commentary connecting health data and privacy. This Section 
concludes by summarizing other sources of federal and state law that 
support the contention that individuals have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their prescribing-related health information. 
1. Fourteenth Amendment Case Law. Fourteenth Amendment 
precedent makes it clear that individuals have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their health-care records. The Court’s decision in Whalen 
v. Roe386  expounded on patients’ privacy interests in their prescribing-
related health information. At issue was a 1972 New York state statute 
that required physicians to report certain Schedule II drug-prescribing
information to the New York State Department of Health (“DOH”).387 
A group of patients and physicians challenged the statute, contending 
that it violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to “nondisclosure
of private information” and to make to independent health-care-
related decisions.388 The Court rejected those arguments, noting that 
“disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital 
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are 
often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.”389 
In addition, the Court emphasized that “[p]ublic disclosure of the 
identity of patients [wa]s expressly prohibited by the statute and by a 
[DOH] regulation.”390 
385. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001).
386. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
387. Id. at 593 (explaining that the statute required the physician to report “identifi[cation of]
the prescribing physician”; “the dispensing pharmacy”; and “the drug and dosage” as well as “the
name, address, and age of the patient” to DOH upon the prescribing of a Schedule II controlled
substance).
 388. Id. at 599–600. 
389. Id. at 600.
 390. Id.
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Although the Whalen Court did not invalidate the New York
statute on privacy grounds under the circumstances, it did recognize 
“the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of 
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files”—more than forty years ago.391 Justice Stevens
explained that 
[t]he right to collect and use [personal and potentially embarrassing] 
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant 
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. . . . New 
York’s statutory scheme . . . evidence[s] a proper concern with, and
protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy. We therefore need
not, and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the 
unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data—whether
intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did not contain 
comparable security provisions.392 
Separately concurring in Whalen, Justice Brennan explained that
“[b]road dissemination by state officials of [patient prescribing
records] . . . would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy 
rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state 
interests.”393 He further contended that “[t]he central storage and easy 
accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for 
abuse of that information” and, as such, he was “not prepared to say
that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some
curb on such technology.”394 With regard to that concern, he concurred 
with the majority only because “[t]he information disclosed by the 
physician under this program is made available only to a small number 
of public health officials with a legitimate interest in the information.”395 
In sum, Whalen recognized that (1) patients and prescribers have 
Fourteenth Amendment privacy interests in their prescribing records; 
(2) patients have a constitutional privacy interest in their right to make
independent health-care decisions; and (3) compulsory disclosure of
prescribing-related records to a state public-health agency is 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as the 
disclosure scheme has safeguards in place to ensure the privacy of that
state-collected information. The DEA invoked Whalen in both the
391. Id. at 605.
 392. Id. at 605–06 (emphasis added). 
393. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973)).
 394. Id. at 607.
 395. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
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Oregon and Utah PDMP cases to support its argument that patients 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescribing records. 
Whalen, however, expressly acknowledges that both patients and 
doctors have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information,396 
which the Court then balanced against the government’s legitimate 
public-welfare interests effectuated by the challenged statutory
scheme.397 Moreover—and contrary to the DEA’s position in the 
PDMP cases—Whalen presumed that the prescribing data collected by
the New York DOH would be protected from disclosure by the state 
statute at issue and not undermined or eroded by a less protective
federal statutory provision.  
In addition, and unlike in Whalen, none of the interested parties 
in the PDMP cases challenged their respective state health agency’s 
right to compel collection of their prescribing information. In fact, the 
PDMP cases were instigated by the state PDMP agencies’ refusal to
comply with DEA subpoenas without a warrant. Thus, Whalen does not 
answer whether the DEA is required to obtain a warrant to access
PDMP data. 
In another decision that advances the notion that patients have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their health-care records, the
Supreme Court struck down the mandatory reporting requirements of 
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.398 In concluding that the
Pennsylvania reporting statute was unconstitutional, Thornburgh
expressly relied on the threat of public disclosure of sensitive patient 
reporting information and its attendant “chilling” effect on patient 
behavior: “Pennsylvania’s reporting requirements raise the specter of 
public exposure and harassment of women who choose to exercise 
their personal, intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a 
pregnancy. Thus, they pose an unacceptable danger of deterring the
exercise of that right, and must be invalidated.”399 
396. Id. at 598–600 (majority opinion). 
397. Id. at 600–04. 
398. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766–68 (1986),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also id. at 765 
(explaining that the Pennsylvania statute mandated that abortion providers give the state a
detailed individual report on each abortion they had performed, including the physician’s name
and the name of the facility where the abortion was performed, the woman’s age, race, marital
status and number of prior pregnancies, her political party and state of residence, and method of
payment).
 399. Id. at 767–68. 
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Thornburgh and subsequent Supreme Court case law have 
challenged—if not outright rejected—the Court’s reasoning in Whalen. 
Roe v. Wade and its progeny, for example, “ma[d]e it clear that [an 
individual’s constitutional] right [to privacy applies to fundamental 
personal rights and] has some extension to activities relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education.”400 These cases, moreover, hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy “encompass[es] a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”401 and her access 
to contraception,402 including her right “to obtain private counseling,
access to medical assistance and up-to-date information in respect to 
proper methods of birth control.”403 
Needless to say, a woman’s prescribing history could reveal that 
she exercised either her right to access contraception or to terminate a 
pregnancy. Such information includes all medications prescribed to her
for ex ante or ex post attempts to avoid conception, ranging from birth-
control pills to Plan B prescriptions.404 It also identifies her prescriber, 
which very well may be the only abortion provider in the area. 
The majority of the federal circuit courts also have concluded that 
a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy extends to medical records, 
prescription records, or both—often in reliance on the abortion and
400. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (quotations and citations omitted); id. at 152 
(contending that “the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy . . . does exist under
the Constitution” and has “found at least the roots of that right . . . in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments”).
 401. Id. at 153.
402. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965). 
403. Id. at 503 (Harlan, J., concurring).
 404. See, e.g., KIMBERLY DANIELS, JILL DAUGHERTY, JO JONES & WILLIAM MOSHER, 
NAT’L HEALTH STATISTICS REPORTS, CURRENT CONTRACEPTIVE USE AND VARIATION BY 
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS AMONG WOMEN AGED 15–44: UNITED STATES, 2011–2013 (Nov.
10, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr086.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MGG-GXMC]
(explaining that “virtually all sexually experienced women in the United States have used
contraception at some time in their lives” and that the pill was the most common method of such
contraception).
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contraception cases.405 In Douglas v. Dobbs,406 for instance, the Tenth
Circuit had “no difficulty concluding that protection of a right to 
privacy in a person’s prescription drug records, which contain intimate
facts of a personal nature, is sufficiently similar to other areas already 
protected within the ambit of privacy.”407 In reaching that result, the 
court reasoned that “[i]nformation contained in prescription records 
not only may reveal other facts about what illnesses a person has, but
may reveal information relating to procreation—whether a woman is 
taking fertility medication for example—as well as information relating
to contraception.”408 
2. Fourth Amendment Case Law. The Supreme Court also has
recognized that patients have a Fourth Amendment reasonable
expectation of privacy in their health records. In Ferguson, for 
example, the Court held that patients have a reasonable expectation 
that their attending hospital would not share their diagnostic-test 
records “with nonmedical personnel without [their] consent.”409 The 
405. See, e.g., Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1184 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A] patient has a privacy 
interest in medical records held by a third party medical services provider.”); Douglas v. Dobbs,
419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We have previously applied th[e] right [to privacy] in the 
context of an employer’s search of an employee’s medical records, and in the context of a 
government official’s disclosure of a person’s HIV status.” (citation omitted)); Tucson Woman’s
Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 550 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]ll provision of medical services in private 
physicians’ offices carries with it a high expectation of privacy for both physician and patient.”); 
Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a patient had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his records on file at a methadone clinic); Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d
1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is a constitutional right to privacy that protects an individual
from the disclosure of information concerning a person’s health.”); Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 (3d Cir. 1995) (“It is now possible from looking at an individual’s
prescription records to determine that person’s illnesses, or . . . ascertain such private facts as
whether a woman is attempting to conceive . . . through the use of fertility drugs. This information
is precisely the sort intended to be protected by penumbras of privacy.”); Doe v. City of New
York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Extension of the right to confidentiality to personal 
medical information recognizes that there are few matters that are quite so personal as the status
of one’s health, and few matters the dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater
control over.”); see also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991) (assuming that the 
right exists); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“Information about one’s body and state of health is matter which the individual is ordinarily 
entitled to retain within the ‘private enclave where he may lead a private life.’” (quoting United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581–82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)). Contra Jarvis v.
Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy does
not apply to medical records).
406. Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2005).
 407. Id. at 1102 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484). 
408. Id. (citations omitted).
409. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
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Ferguson Court also acknowledged that “an intrusion on that 
expectation [of privacy] may have adverse consequences because it 
may deter patients from receiving needed medical care.”410 
Although Ferguson is important and persuasive precedent, it is 
distinguishable from the PDMP cases. Ferguson did not involve state-
sanctioned collection of health-care information because no law 
required the state hospital to perform the diagnostic tests at issue.411 
Ferguson also did not concern a law enforcement demand for sensitive 
health data held by a state actor pursuant to a compulsory process 
expressly endorsed by a federal statute, like the CSA.412 Indeed, the 
state hospital in Ferguson voluntarily submitted its patients’ diagnostic 
drug-test results to local law enforcement pursuant to a collaborative 
agreement.413 
Notably, the Supreme Court has referenced the private nature of 
an individual’s medical appointments and health-care-related internet 
searches on several occasions in its recent digital-surveillance cases. In
Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that “[a] cell phone 
faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into
private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other 
potentially revealing locales.”414 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent also points
out that indiscriminate application of the third-party doctrine leads to 
the inevitable conclusion that “the Constitution does nothing to limit 
investigators from searching records you’ve entrusted to your bank, 
accountant, and maybe even your doctor.”415 
The unanimous majority in Riley, which held that police are 
forbidden from searching an individual’s cell phone incident to arrest, 
expressed similar concerns. There, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out 
that “an Internet-enabled phone . . . could reveal an individual’s
privacy interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms
410. Id. at 78 n.14 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)).
 411. Id. at 70–73 (explaining that the hospital decided on its own accord to conduct 
nonconsensual and surreptitious urine screens of pregnant women receiving prenatal treatment 
on the theory that there was an “apparent increase in the use of cocaine” by those patients and 
“such use harmed the fetus and was therefore child abuse”).
 412. Id. (providing that the hospital reached out to local law enforcement to offer its
“cooperation in prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth”).
 413. Id. at 71–72 (explaining that the hospital entered into a collaborative agreement with
local law enforcement in which it agreed to test a patient “for cocaine through a urine drug screen
if she met one or more of nine criteria” and then immediately refer any patients who tested
positive while pregnant to law enforcement for arrest and prosecution). 
414. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (emphasis added).
415. Id. at 2261 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”416 Justice
Sotomayor likewise explained in her Jones concurrence that GPS data
could disclose “trips the indisputably private nature of which takes 
little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon,
the abortion clinic, [and] the AIDS treatment center.”417 
The point here is a simple one: if information that reveals one’s 
trips to a doctor’s office, abortion clinic, or AIDS treatment center is 
of an “indisputably private nature” and cell phone searches trigger 
significant privacy concerns because they could disclose frequent visits 
to WebMD or searches for disease symptoms, then an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their sensitive and often disease-
identifying prescribing records. Indeed, medical prescribing records 
frequently expose more personal and potentially stigmatizing 
information than one’s treatment-related travel or web searches. 
3. Other Pertinent Privacy Statutes and Regulations. Federal 
statutes and regulations further support the claim that patients have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescribing records. For 
instance, HIPAA418 and the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act419 prohibit the nonconsensual
disclosure of patients’ protected health information to third parties by 
covered entities and their business associates.420 Similarly, 42 C.F.R. § 2
protects identifying information concerning individuals in substance-
abuse treatment programs.421 Various state constitutions422 and privacy
416. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (emphasis added).
417. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
418. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
419. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (enacted as part of the American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115).
420. 42 U.S.C. §§ 17931, 17934 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2018).
421. 42 C.F.R. § 2 (2018).
422. Manela v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736, 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing the
California constitutional right to privacy in medical records); State v. Johnson, 814 So. 2d 390, 393 
(Fla. 2002) (recognizing the Florida constitutional right to privacy in medical records); King v. 
State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 494–95 (Ga. 2000) (recognizing the Georgia constitutional right to privacy
in medical records); Brende v. Hara, 153 P.3d 1109, 1115 (Haw. 2007) (recognizing the Hawaii
constitutional right to privacy in medical records); State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (La. 2009)
(holding that “a warrant is required to conduct an investigatory search of medical and/or
prescription records” under the Louisiana Constitution); T.L.S. v. Mont. Advocacy Program, 144 
P.3d 818, 824 (Mont. 2006) (recognizing the Montana constitutional right to privacy in a patient’s
medical history); see also Catherine Louisa Glenn, Protecting Health Information Privacy: The
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statutes423 also bolster the conclusion that individuals have privacy 
rights in their health-care records. And the majority of states expressly
extend privacy protections to patient prescribing information in their 
PDMP statutes, including provisions that limit law enforcement access 
to PDMP data.424 The volume of positive law providing privacy
protections to patient data would go a long way to convincing a judge 
like Justice Gorsuch, who seemed sympathetic to such an argument in 
his Carpenter dissent.425 
In sum, myriad sources of federal and state law indicate that 
patients have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their PDMP
prescribing information. By comparison, the Court’s holding that 
Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location and 
movements drew largely from two concurring opinions from a single 
prior Court decision—United States v. Jones.426 Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent, in fact, criticizes the majority for grounding its holding on such
little support.427 A parallel holding that individuals have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in their historic prescribing information would
rest on a considerably more robust positive-law foundation than that 
which supported the Court’s ruling concerning an individual’s locations 
and movements in Carpenter. 
Finally, the Carpenter majority held that the petitioner had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI even though those 
records largely revealed his public movements. The Court reasoned 
that “what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”428 The PDMP cases, 
however, do not involve any information that patients exposed to the 
public. Instead, the data at issue in the PDMP cases—patient 
Case for Self-Regulation of Electronically Held Medical Records, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1605, 1609
n.25 (2000) (identifying the constitutions of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington as protecting health-information privacy).
 423. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 6 n.19 (2009) (listing state statutes that protect health information). 
424. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO PDMP REPORTS, supra note 54 (demonstrating that at
least twenty-eight states require law enforcement to obtain a warrant or court order to obtain
PDMP data).
425. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2272 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
 426. Id. at 2217 (2018) (Alito, J., concurring) (first citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); then citing id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
 427. Carpenter, 128 S. Ct. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
 428. Id. at 2217 (majority opinion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 
(1967)).
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prescribing records—are generated as a result of confidential
physician–patient communications for the purpose of providing health-
care diagnosis and treatment. Given the Court’s determination that 
individuals’ public travel and movements “hold for many Americans 
the ‘privacies of life[,]’”429 it is difficult to controvert the conclusion that 
historic prescribing information does, too. 
B. The Post-Carpenter Third-Party Doctrine 
The Supreme Court refused to “mechanically apply[] the third-
party doctrine” to CSLI records in Carpenter.430 Instead, it explained 
that, while “[t]he . . . doctrine partly stems from the notion that an 
individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information 
knowingly shared with [others,] . . . Smith and Miller . . . did not rely 
solely on the act of sharing.”431 Smith and Miller, as the Chief Justice
pointed out, require courts to take into consideration the nature of the 
documents sought in determining whether the search target has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in their contents notwithstanding 
information sharing.432 Moreover, the third-party doctrine is rooted in 
the concept of voluntary exposure.433 This is because the doctrine’s 
assumption-of-the-risk rationale does not hold up absent a consensual 
transfer of information from the target to the third party.434 This
Section applies these dispositive third-party-doctrine limiting 
principles to PDMP prescribing information. 
1. The Nature of the Records Sought. The records at issue in the 
PDMP cases—medical records that include patient prescribing
information—are extremely revealing, often sensitive, and 
undoubtedly private in nature. As the Oregon district court 
acknowledged in its PDMP decision, “[i]t is difficult to conceive of
information that is more private or more deserving of Fourth
Amendment protection.”435 Indeed, knowledge of nothing more than 
the identity of the drug that a physician has prescribed to a patient can 
reveal that patient’s medical condition with specificity. For example, a
429. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)). 




 434. Id. at 2220. 
435. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d
957, 966 (D. Or. 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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patient whose PDMP records disclosed that the patient was on a
prescribed treatment regime of biweekly, self-administrated, injectable 
testosterone—a Schedule III controlled substance—would be exposed 
as having a diagnosis of gender dysphoria—a condition that has no 
alternative indicated pharmaceutical treatment.436 Moreover, and as 
the intervenors explained in the Oregon PDMP litigation, information 
about the quantity and frequency of a patient’s testosterone 
prescriptions discloses not only that the patient is transitioning from 
female to male, but also the precise stage of that patient’s transition.437 
In addition, and as explained above, a wide range of positive law,
including the constitutional right to privacy and numerous federal and 
state statutes, supports the determination that patients have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescribing-related health 
records. The Oregon PDMP statute, for instance, is highly protective 
of patients’ right to confidentiality in their prescribing information. It 
expressly provides that prescription monitoring data submitted to the 
PDMP “[i]s protected health information,”438 and “[i]s confidential and 
not subject to disclosure”439 but for a limited number of narrow 
exceptions. Most importantly, such data is only subject to law 
enforcement agency access “[p]ursuant to a valid court order based on 
probable cause” where such agency is engaged “in an authorized drug-
related investigation involving a person to whom the requested 
information pertains.”440 As a result, it is easy to argue that an Oregon 
patient has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescribing
information. Privacy expert Daniel Solove’s recent musings about the 
third-party doctrine’s application to medical records sum things up
nicely:
Would the Supreme Court really hold that people lack an expectation
of privacy in their medical data because they convey that information 
to Third Parties (their physicians)? The result would strike many as
absurd. The logic of the Third Party Doctrine leads to this result, 
which is probably why the Supreme Court has avoided taking a case
436. Plaintiff-Intervenors Complaint at 16, Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. 
Supp. 2d 957 (No. 12-2023).
 437. Id. at 22; see also id. at 19 (explaining that knowledge that a patient is taking certain
medication, such as clonazepam, reveals that the individual has been diagnosed with mental
illness). 
438. OR. REV. STAT. § 431A.865(1)(a)(A) (2017). 
439. Id. § 431A.865(1)(a)(B). 
440. Id. § 431A.865(2)(a)(G). 
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that would result in this holding. It would be the kind of case that
would lead to a public uproar.441 
2. The Voluntariness of the Information Conveyed.  The third-party 
doctrine’s assumption-of-the-risk rationale rests on voluntariness: that 
a person does not assume the risk of third-party betrayal unless he or
she voluntarily transfers information to that third party. The Carpenter
Court relied on this fundamental limitation of the third-party doctrine 
in holding that the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his CSLI.442 As the majority reasoned, Carpenter’s CSLI was “not 
truly ‘shared’ [with his wireless carrier] as one normally understands
the term” for two reasons.443 First, cell phones are pervasive to the 
extent that “carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern 
society.”444 Second, “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its 
operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user besides
powering up.”445 
The receipt of necessary medical treatment, including
prescription-drug therapy, is similarly “indispensable to participation 
in modern society,”446 particularly when such treatment is necessarily
indispensable to living. And while the decision to forgo cell phone use 
might be debilitating, it is highly unlikely to initiate or contribute to a 
public-health catastrophe. But when individuals forgo treatment for 
communicable diseases, such as, for example, MRSA, tuberculosis, 
hepatitis, Ebola, HIV, influenza, and gonorrhea, public health and
safety is placed in peril. Public health and safety are also implicated 
when individuals avoid medical treatment for mental illness, 
substance-use disorder, or other stigmatizing conditions. 
Moreover, a patient’s confidential disclosure of sensitive health 
information to her physician for the purposes of diagnosis and
treatment does not vitiate her reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
data. The Supreme Court held as much in Ferguson when it ruled that
patients had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the health-care-
441. Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine Should Be
Overruled in Carpenter v. US, TEACHPRIVACY (Nov. 28, 2017), https://teachprivacy.com/ 
carpenter-v-us-10-reasons-fourth-amendment-third-party-doctrine-overruled [https://perma.cc/
7N2T-E5EF].
442. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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related information they voluntarily conveyed to a state hospital for 
medical-treatment purposes.447 Similarly, in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,448 the Court held that employees had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the results of the urine tests that 
they voluntarily disclosed to a third party—their employer. As the Von 
Raab Court explained, those “[t]est results may not be used in a
criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s 
consent.”449 
Importantly, the Court has also “assumed . . . for many reasons, 
[that] physicians have an interest in keeping their prescription 
decisions confidential.”450 As physicians have recognized dating back 
to the inception of the Hippocratic Oath,451 patient confidences 
“impose[] an obligation of secrecy upon [doctors], and thus prevent 
[their] making public what [they] cannot avoid seeing or hearing.”452 In 
keeping with that tradition, the American Medical Association has 
promulgated an ethics rule that “information disclosed to a physician 
during the course of the relationship between physician and patient is 
confidential to the greatest possible degree.”453 Consistent with this 
fundamental tenet of the practice of medicine, at least forty-four states,
including Oregon and Utah, “have enacted physician-patient privilege 
statutes.”454 The purposes of the physician–patient privilege include,
among other things, “further[ing] the doctor-patient relationship,” 
“encourag[ing] unrestrained communication,” and “encourag[ing] 
447. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (“The reasonable expectation of
privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results
of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”).
448. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
 449. Id. at 666.
450. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
 451. See, for example, In re: Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, No. MDL 1657, 2005 WL 
2036797 (E.D. La. July 22, 2005), where the court wrote: 
The classical version of the Hippocratic Oath reads in pertinent part: “What I may see
or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the
life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding 
such things shameful to be spoken about.” 
Id. at *3.
 452. Benjamin Rush, On the Duties of Patients to Their Physicians, in  SIXTEEN 
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES 322 (1811).
 453. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 88 (1998).
454. Yedishtra Naidoo & J. Richard Ciccone, The Reporting of Child Abuse Argued as an
Exception to Physician–Patient Privilege in Criminal Proceedings, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 
270, 271 (2016).
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physicians to fully and accurately record their patients’ confidential 
information.”455 
The long-standing confidentially rules that apply to physician– 
patient communications cut against the notion that patients voluntarily 
abandon the sensitive and intimate information they share with their
providers in the course of diagnosis and treatment. Instead, these laws, 
which expressly attend heightened privacy protections to physician– 
patient communications, lead patients to reasonably believe that the 
information they convey to their health care providers is shielded from 
unfettered law enforcement access. Moreover and as already
emphasized, patients cannot avoid sharing information with their 
providers unless they are willing to sacrifice their access to potentially 
life-saving health-care treatment. “Even compared to owning a
smartphone, individuals cannot easily choose to avoid professional 
medical care, making the production of these records inescapable and 
automatic.”456 
Finally, even assuming that a patient’s decision to communicate
sensitive, prescribing-related information to her physician for 
treatment and diagnosis amounts to a “voluntary” transfer of that 
information for third-party doctrine purposes, it is irrelevant in the 
context of the PDMP cases. This is because patients never share their 
prescribing data with the state PDMPs—voluntarily or otherwise. And 
dispensers only do so involuntarily because they are mandated to 
transfer patient prescribing-related information to the PDMPs by state
law. 
C. Potential Post-Carpenter Pitfalls 
This Article contends that DEA warrantless searches of PDMP 
prescribing information violate the Fourth Amendment under 
pertinent pre-Carpenter precedent and Carpenter itself. Two potential 
pitfalls, however, challenge these conclusions. First, certain distinctions 
between the type of data that the FBI sought in Carpenter—CSLI— 
and the type of data the DEA seeks from PDMPs—prescribing-related 
health information—could provoke a ruling that patients do not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their PDMP records. Second, 
lower federal courts might uphold warrantless DEA PDMP searches 
pursuant to the “highly regulated industries” exception to the Fourth 
455. Id.
 456. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 383 (2019). 
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Amendment, which is separate and distinct from the third-party 
doctrine. Each of these challenges is discussed, in turn, below.
1. Carpenter May Not Apply to PDMP Databases Due to Their 
Lack of Sophistication and Pervasiveness. It is possible to read
Carpenter, alongside Riley and Jones, as little more than an extension 
of special or heightened Fourth Amendment protection to devices like 
cell phones and GPS units and the data those devices store and emit. 
This would make these cases inapplicable to less sophisticated,
electronically stored third-party information, such as that contained in
PDMPs, regardless of the significance of the privacy concerns that 
attend to those databases. This limited reading of Carpenter is 
provoked by at least three observations: the Court’s overt refusal to 
overrule Smith and Miller;457 its overriding concern about pervasive,
nonstop surveillance;458 and its emphasis on the narrowness of its 
decision and express refusal to extend its holding to “conventional
surveillance techniques.”459 As one legal scholar has noted, Carpenter
“evinces . . . a profound tech exceptionalism.”460 In fact, the Court’s 
heavy reliance on the ever-increasing sophistication and accuracy of 
CSLI throughout Carpenter, alone, indicates that it seeks to draw a line 
between older digital technologies and new data-collection systems.  
While it remains to be seen which side of that line the Court will 
deem appropriate for patient prescribing information collected by state 
PDMP databases, the growing sophistication of PDMP databases 
supports imposing a warrant requirement. PDMPs are no longer 
simply passive databases that store voluminous amounts of sensitive 
and potentially stigmatizing patient health-care data. Instead, they are
“smart” databases that rely on robust data-analytics software. One
such software, “NarxCare,” uses black-box algorithms that mine
through a patient’s PDMP information to produce multiple three-digit
“risk scores,” including a composite overdose-risk score, collectively
called “Narx Scores.”461 Moreover, the company that owns NarxCare
457. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
 458. Id. at 2219–20. 
459. Id. at 2220. 
460. Ohm, supra note 456, at 360.
461. Appriss’s website provides details about its PDMP software, NarxCare, stating that
“NarxCare is a robust analytics tool and care management platform that helps prescribers and
dispensers analyze real-time controlled substance data from Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs (PDMPs) and manage substance use disorder” and that “NarxCare automatically 
analyzes PDMP data and a patient’s health history and provides patient risk scores and an
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and controls its algorithms, Appriss Health, describes NarxCare as “a 
robust analytics tool and care management platform” and concedes 
that 
[t]he identification of patients at risk is only the beginning of a 
comprehensive platform needed to impact the increasing prevalence 
of substance use disorder. NarxCare extends beyond information and 
insights to provide tools and resources to enable care teams to support 
patient needs.462 
Appriss also has publicly stated that it is working to gather
pertinent information from patient electronic health records, including
emergency-room records, court records, and other sources in order to 
improve and hone the precision of its predictive Narx Score algorithms.
In fact, at least three states already incorporate patients’ criminal 
histories into their PDMP databases.463 PDMPs, therefore, are
constantly evolving by collecting more and more sensitive data from an
expansive number of sources and adopting smarter and smarter trade-
secret-protected software, data-analytics tools, and algorithms. As a
result, even assuming PDMPs are not yet sophisticated and pervasive 
enough to satisfy Carpenter today, they are swiftly—and inevitably— 
moving in that direction.464 
In the age of “personalized” medicine, the growing precision and
sophistication of targeted pharmaceutical treatments and 
pharmacogenetics presents an additional argument in response to the
contention that PDMPs are not sufficiently technologically advanced 
to satisfy Carpenter. As noted earlier in this Article, PDMP data is 
incredibly sensitive. In fact, the development of targeted 
pharmaceutical treatments means not only that it is entirely possible to 
identify a patient’s medical condition or diagnosis with the patient’s 
prescribing data, but that it is sometimes possible to identify the stage 
of the patient’s condition or disease with dose or quantity data. In 
addition, the emerging field of pharmacogenetics promises the 
interactive visualization of usage patterns to help identify potential risk factors.” NarxCare, 
APPRISS (2019), https://apprisshealth.com/solutions/narxcare [https://perma.cc/T3FS-D3MJ].
 462. Id.
 463. Beletsky, supra note 52, at 169 (explaining that Wisconsin, Kentucky, and Maine
integrate criminal justice information into their state PDMPs).
464. Bolstering this point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
applied Carpenter to conclude that government access to “smart” electric-meter data constitutes
a Fourth Amendment search. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900
F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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development of even more sensitive and precise disease-identifying
PDMP data.465 
“The aim of pharmacogenetics is to combine targeted therapies 
with companion pretreatment diagnostic tests, which identify whether 
a person carries a gene or other biomarker that is linked with increased
sensitivity to or resistance to the particular treatment.”466 This 
burgeoning field has already realized some measure of success in 
various oncological treatments. The federal Food and Drug
Administration, for example, has approved the drug Herceptin to treat 
“HER2” positive tumors.467 And “[o]ther molecular tests paired with
appropriately targeted therapeutics are available for other cancer types 
including malignant melanoma, colorectal cancer, and several sub-
types of leukemia and lymphoma.”468 Thus, while the PDMP databases 
may appear simple on initial glance, the information that populates 
them is incredibly revealing and constantly growing in sophistication. 
Instead of relying the sophistication of PDMP-database software,
analytics, and smart algorithms to contend that PDMP prescribing 
information should fall within the ambit of Carpenter, health-data 
advocates should consider arguing that it is the sophistication and
sensitivity of the controlled-substance information stored in PDMPs 
that satisfies Carpenter’s implicit advanced-technology requirement.
Relying on similar logic, at least one legal scholar has already
contended that databases that contain genetic data are entitled to 
Fourth Amendment warrant protection under Carpenter.469 
2. Carpenter Does Not Address the Highly Regulated Industries 
Exception to the Warrant Requirement. The Supreme Court has long
held that “administrative searches conducted without a warrant . . .
[violate] the Fourth Amendment guarantee[]” against unreasonable
searches.470 The Court nonetheless has created an exception to the 
warrant requirement for searches of “highly regulated industries.” 
Over the past half century, the Court has identified only four 
465. Dianne Nicol et al., Precision Medicine: Drowning in a Regulatory Soup?, 3 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 281, 287 (2016). 
466. Id.
 467. Id. at 288.
 468. Id.
 469. See generally Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357
(2019). 
470. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
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industries—liquor sales,471 firearms dealing,472 mining,473 and 
automobile junkyards474—that are subject to such expansive 
government oversight that “no reasonable expectation of privacy could
exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise.”475 
Whether an industry is highly regulated depends on the “duration
of the [applicable] regulation’s existence, [the] pervasiveness of the
regulatory scheme, and [the] regularity of 
the regulation’s application.”476 If a court concludes that an
industry is highly regulated, the court must then determine whether 
the warrantless search at issue is reasonable. Three criteria must be
met: (1) “there must be a ‘substantial’ government interest that informs 
the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made”; (2)
“the warrantless inspections must be ‘necessary to further [the] 
regulatory scheme’”; and (3) “the statute’s inspection program . . . 
[must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant.”477 
The Supreme Court grappled with the highly regulated industries 
exception most recently in City of Los Angeles v. Patel.478 That case
involved a Fourth Amendment challenge by Los Angeles hotel 
operators to a “provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code that
require[d] hotel operators to make their registries available to the
police on demand.”479 In its analysis, the Patel Court explained that “the 
closely regulated industry . . . is the exception”480 and that “classif[ication
of] hotels as pervasively regulated would permit what has always been 
a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”481 Ultimately, the Court held 
that the hotel business did not constitute a highly regulated industry.
471. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
472. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
473. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981); see also id. at 602 (describing the mining 
industry as “among the most hazardous in the country”).
474. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703–12 (1987); see also id. at 709 (“Automobile
junkyards and vehicle dismantlers provide the major market for stolen vehicles and vehicle 
parts.”). 
475. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
476. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 544 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Donovan, 452 U.S. 594, 605–06). 
477. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600–03). 
478. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
 479. Id. at 2447. 
480. Id. at 2455 (emphasis added) (quoting Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313).
 481. Id. at 2447. 
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However, the Court went on to explain that “[e]ven if we were to
find that hotels are pervasively regulated,”482 the Los Angeles
Municipal Code’s warrantless inspection regime was nonetheless 
constitutionally deficient because (1) it was unnecessary to further the 
regulatory scheme and (2) “it fail[ed] to sufficiently constrain police 
officers’ discretion as to which hotels to search and under what 
circumstances” “under the ‘certainty and regularity’ prong of the 
closely regulated industries test.”483 
The Utah district court upheld the DEA’s PDMP searches, in part, 
on the theory that “[p]rescription drugs are a highly regulated industry
in which patients and doctors do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”484 The court’s discussion of that exception, in toto, was as
follows: 
Prescription drugs are a highly regulated industry in which patients 
and doctors do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
Sixth Circuit has held that the pharmaceutical industry, like the 
mining, firearms, and liquor industries, is a pervasively regulated
industry and that consequently pharmacists and distributors subject 
to the [CSA] have a reduced expectation of privacy in the records 
kept in compliance with the [CSA]. As one federal district court
explained, the CSA was intended as a comprehensive federal 
program to place certain drugs and other substances under strict 
federal controls. In other words, the expectation created by the CSA
is that the prescription and use of controlled substances will happen 
under the watchful eye of the federal government.485 
The district court’s application and limited analysis of the highly
regulated industries exception in the context of warrantless PDMP
searches is problematic for at least two reasons. First, DEA warrantless 
PDMP searches do not conform to the minimum requirements of the 
highly regulated industry exception. The highly “regulated industry
exception applies to searches of commercial premises for civil
purposes.”486 The DEA did not issue subpoenas in the PDMP litigation 
that sought to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial premises 
for such purposes. Instead, it issued subpoenas that demanded sensitive 
482. Id. at 2456. 
483. Id.
484. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868, at
*8 (D. Utah July 27, 2017).
 485. Id. (quotations omitted).
 486. Note, Rethinking Closely Regulated Industries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 797, 797 (2016).
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prescribing information contained in a state agency’s electronic 
database in the course of criminal investigations. 
No other federal court has applied the highly regulated industry 
exception to a law enforcement search of information held by a state 
agency—as opposed to an inspection of a commercial enterprise. The
Utah district court ignored the fact that the DEA’s subpoenas were 
directed at a government entity and, instead, focused its attention on 
the nature of the “pharmaceutical industry.” Whether the court was 
correct that the “pharmaceutical industry” is highly regulated,
however, is of no moment because the DEA did not serve the 
administrative subpoenas on any “pharmaceutical industry” entity—it 
directed its subpoenas to the state PDMP agency. 
The Utah district court’s analysis is even more curious given that 
the CSA expressly prohibits the DEA from “inspecting, copying, and
verifying the correctness of records, reports or other documents 
required to be kept” by “controlled premises”—including factories, 
warehouses, pharmacies, and other commercial establishments487— 
without an administrative inspection warrant.488 The DEA, therefore, is 
proscribed by its own enabling statute from conducting a warrantless 
inspection on a pharmaceutical industry entity.489 Indeed, the lone case
that the Utah district court relied on to support its highly regulated
industries ruling—United States v. Acklen490—decided “whether 
evidence seized [from the defendant’s pharmacy] pursuant to an 
administrative inspection warrant . . . should be suppressed in a criminal
trial for violations of the Controlled Substances Act if the primary
purpose of the administrative inspection search was to obtain evidence 
for criminal prosecution.”491 Because Acklen involved the DEA’s 
search of a pharmacy, which the CSA only permits pursuant to a court-
ordered administrative-inspection warrant, it cannot support the
DEA’s issuance or enforcement of an administrative subpoena 
directed at a state PDMP agency.
Second, the Utah district court was required to assess whether the 
DEA’s warrantless search of PDMP prescribing information was 
487. 21 U.S.C. § 880(a)–(b) (2018).
 488. Id. § 880(b)(1)–(2). 
489. Id.; see also id. § 880(c) (listing the situations where the DEA is permitted to inspect
books and records pursuant to an administrative subpoena, including when the owner consents
or when exigent circumstances exist).
490. United States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1982).
 491. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
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reasonable.492 Nowhere in its decision does the court reach even a
conclusory determination with regard to any of the three criteria 
enumerated above applicable to the constitutional reasonableness 
analysis. As already noted, the Utah district court’s application of the 
highly regulated industries exception to enforce the DEA’s 
administrative subpoenas of state PDMP databases was anomalous 
and likely unwarranted. If pertinent precedent is any guide, Fourth
Amendment challenges to such subpoenas are likely to rise or fall on
the merits of the two warrant exceptions directly addressed in 
Carpenter: the administrative-subpoena exception and the third-party 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION
The diversion and problematic use of prescription drugs in the 
United States provoked a public-health crisis and, predictably, a 
predominantly supply-side, law-enforcement-centric response, 
including the ubiquitous creation of state PDMPs. These programs 
collect, store, and analyze reams of highly sensitive, personal, and 
sometimes stigmatizing patient prescribing data. The DEA’s 
unchecked, sweeping, and virtually instantaneous access to PDMP
prescribing information—which include, among other things, 
diagnosis-identifying information—raises material Fourth 
Amendment concerns. In the apt words of one public-health scholar,
“[g]overnment surveillance systems, including various electronic 
databases like PDMPs . . . have a sinister side.”493 
Fortunately, this “sinister” and sweeping surveillance is foreclosed 
both by pre-Carpenter precedent and Carpenter itself. The latter, in 
particular, practically demands that courts put a stop to the DEA’s 
widespread practice of conducting dragnet-style searches of state 
PDMP prescribing data without judicial oversight and probable cause.
Ultimately, before the government can compel the disclosure of 
patient prescribing information, it must abide by a “familiar” 
admonition—“get a warrant.”494 
492. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987).
 493. Beletsky, supra note 52, at 142.
494. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2211, 2223 (2018).
